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The Independence of Right from Ethics Allen Wood Right and ethics ...

The Independence of Right from Ethics Allen Wood Right and ethics ...

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<strong>The</strong> foundation <strong>of</strong> the entire sphere <strong>of</strong> right lies in the fact that human beings have goodreason to protect rightful freedom; <strong>and</strong> this reason is independent <strong>of</strong> ethical value, <strong>and</strong> <strong>of</strong> theprinciple <strong>of</strong> morality grounding ethical duties. <strong>The</strong> problem is to underst<strong>and</strong> this independentground <strong>of</strong> rightful freedom, <strong>and</strong> also how it remains independent <strong>of</strong> the value that grounds thecategorical imperative <strong>of</strong> morality that Kant derived in the Groundwork. Another way to look atthis problem is to see it as providing an interpretation <strong>and</strong> defense <strong>of</strong> Kant’s claim that rightfulexternal freedom – independence <strong>from</strong> constraint by the choice <strong>of</strong> another – is “the sole original<strong>and</strong> innate right belonging to every human being by virtue <strong>of</strong> his humanity” (MS 6:237). And ifthe sphere <strong>of</strong> right is to be independent <strong>of</strong> that <strong>of</strong> <strong>ethics</strong>, this defense must be independent <strong>of</strong>Kant’s claim in the sphere <strong>of</strong> <strong>ethics</strong> that humanity in persons is an end in itself.External freedom <strong>and</strong> the rational structure <strong>of</strong> action. <strong>The</strong> solution to this problem, Ibelieve, lies in Kant’s conception <strong>of</strong> the fundamental rational structure <strong>of</strong> action. All action forKant is based on setting an end – an object or state <strong>of</strong> affairs to be produced. It is the essentialcharacteristic <strong>of</strong> rational nature to set ends: “Rational nature discriminates itself <strong>from</strong> the rest inthat it sets itself an end” (G 4:437). An action, by its concept, is that which lies within the power<strong>of</strong> the agent, <strong>and</strong> is chosen by the agent as a means to some end (G 4:417). Kant says: “Thatwhich serves the will as the objective ground <strong>of</strong> its self-determination is the end… By contrast,what contains merely the ground <strong>of</strong> the possibility <strong>of</strong> the action whose effect is the end is calledthe means” (G 4:427).Practical reason applies to action in a variety <strong>of</strong> ways. First, it applies instrumentally: Rules<strong>of</strong> skill tell us the best means to a given end, while a technical imperative <strong>of</strong> reason, groundingthe rational authority <strong>of</strong> such rules, requires us, on pain <strong>of</strong> a failure <strong>of</strong> rationality, to take theindispensable means in our power toward any end we have set (G 4:414-415). Second, reason4

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