Security Sector Reform and Donor Assistance in Serbia - Defence ...

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Donor assistance does not just encompass financial assistance; other significant forms ofassistance are provided to Serbia. An example is a state providing direct assistance via amultilateral organisation, such as expertise through a secondment to the OSCE or directly toa Serbian Ministry in advisory roles.When it comes to the use of direct foreign expertise there has been a tendency to utilise onlysubject experts, who may have little holistic understanding of Serbia. In this sense, one canargue there is a lack of capacity by many donors to support adequate SSR initiativesover a period of time – a serious handicap when we consider that change takes time andthe domestic capacity to take lead is limited. This was reinforced in discussion, during whichdomestic interlocutors interviewed complained that foreign experts do not understand thespecificities of the environment in which they were operating and had only narrow expertisein either defence or police issues. Few had practical expertise from similar settings in areassuch as change management, social development, administration reform, judiciary orstrategic planning. As can be expected, such experts tend to import solutions andmethodologies directly from their own experiences, either from their own or some othercountry, which are simply not applicable to Serbia.Two issues regarding the political perceptions of international involvement in SSR inSerbia were raised during the research. The first issue concerns the relationship between theimage of one country and its involvement in that process. Apparently, a positive image ofcertain countries such as Norway is contributing to an acceptance of their involvement in theprocess by the general public in Serbia. Norwegian policy towards Serbia and assistance forSSR has a high level of public approval, because of historical reasons and the generallypositive image of Norway held by Serbians. Testimony to this reference is the fact thatNorway is one of the most desirable partners in joint projects, not only because of theresources it contributes, but also because of popular acceptance of its engagement. On theother hand, representatives of governments which are significant donors in the field, butwhose public image is not very high, do not receive much local publicity. There is a questionas to whether the donor state or Serbian institutions should be responsible for the PR offoreign actors, possibly requiring commonly developed communication approaches.The second issue is whether the recent deterioration in political relations between Serbia anda number of countries which recognized the self–proclaimed independence of Kosovo hasinfluenced their cooperation in SSR. It can be observed that despite the special measureswhich Serbia introduced, including the withdrawal of ambassadors from a number ofcountries that recognised independence, the SSR aspect and engagement of thesecountries was only temporarily suspended and is now more or less back on track, at least interms of levels of cooperation.However, the one relationship which has not recuperated, mainly as a result of morestrategic political issues, is the NATO-Serbia relationship. The DRG process has beencompletely halted despite its positive impact, as noted above.20
Section 4 – Coordination and HarmonisationThe coordination of actors and harmonisation of programmes has been very difficultin Serbia for a variety of reasons. Faults lie on both sides, with both recipients and donors.While this is not unique to Serbia, two aspects are noteworthy: the prevalence of anegative attitude to foreign assistance at various levels of decision-making in the fieldof SSR and the anticipated reduction in attention from donors.At the time of writing there was no formal instrument for donor coordination and verylittle in terms of harmonisation when it comes to SSR in Serbia. Considering theimportance of foreign donations this is a worrying factor, both in terms of expected outputand change management in general. Moreover, as governance reform becomes morecomplex and based on cross-sector (inter/intra-ministerial) cooperation, it will be difficult toimplement required reforms in an effective and efficient manner without domesticharmonisation and alignment of all these aspects.Coordination by DonorsThere are no blueprints for carrying out security sector reform, which is specific to the contextof individual countries. There is also no one model of which areas should be targeted bysecurity sector reform activities. It is vital therefore that donors conduct a thorough countryassessment prior to any engagement in order to understand the context and local realities.Most donors have recognised that this lack of coordination is a major obstacle to moreefficient and effective SSR in Serbia, in line with the Paris Declaration signed in 2005, ofwhich all the major stakeholders are a signatory, including Serbia. 52 As such they have beentempted to introduce various modes of cooperation, with limited overall success. Thefundamental question is: on who's behalf are these coordination initiatives takingplace?As will be discussed in more detail below, the European Commission (EC) has until recentlynot prioritised security sector reform, mainly because of the political sensitivities involved.However, even if donors shy away from the term ‘security sector reform’, they may engage inSSR activities under the umbrella of good governance or bilateral military assistance.The question is reasonable given the importance of donor engagement and the lack ofadequate response from the relevant Serbian institutions. Considering Serbia's negativeattitude to what is perceived as external interference, such formalised coordination meetingsare seen as an attempt to impose thinking and more importantly, as a loss of control over theprocess. This problem is further exacerbated by the nature of the highly politicised andcentralised public administration in Serbia, which severely limits required horizontal lines ofcommunication.As a result most coordination initiatives have been externally driven, leading some observersto note that they are more for the benefit of the donor community, than Serbia itself. The52 The Paris Declaration, endorsed on 2 March 2005, is an international agreement to whichover 100 Ministers, Heads of Agencies and other senior officials adhered and committed theircountries and organisations to continue to increase efforts in harmonisation, alignment andmanaging aid for results with a set of monitorable actions and indicators.21
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