Security Sector Reform and Donor Assistance in Serbia - Defence ...

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Furthermore, by looking at these two areas of SSR, it is more in line with the Lisbon Treaty’sprovisions on this theme. 2The question of evaluation is relevant to the context of this paper, as it is necessary to definewhether it is donor demands (expectations) or the legitimate policy objectives of the recipientcountry that is being assessed. In other words, should success be measured against whatthe host country desires, or against the expectations placed by external stakeholders. Thispaper has opted to measure actual reform progress against the publicly stated policy aims ofthe Serbian government. In police reform this refers to requirements related to EUintegration, whilst in the field of defence reform this refers to closer Euro-Atlantic integration,despite the recent lack of a clear NATO policy stance.Chris Donnelly, a former special advisor to NATO and someone deeply involved in NATOaccession and reform in CE Europe, correctly states that SSR is becoming increasinglycomplex to evaluate 3 . No longer does evaluation focus on the conversion of armed forcesand overcoming legacies from the past. It now has more to do with addressing societalreform, technology reform, information reform and a fundamental change in the nature ofconflict and security.Serbia is firmly in the so-called ‘first generation’ of the SSR process 4 , and has, contrary toexpectations, somehow lost in its attempts to enter the ‘second generation’, as arguedbelow 5 . In other words, responsibility for this lack of progress must ultimately rest with thelack of a clear vision and capacity for the implementation of politically declared goals.Furthermore, if reform is to advance, it entails change. This requires change agents, whichare not always visible in Serbia (at least not in terms of required critical mass at the highestlevels), thus making joint development of programmes with local ownership difficult.Operational thinking and the ad-hoc ‘fire-extinguishing’ modus operandi is furtherburdening the process, with hard strategic decisions being postponed.While some argue that there is a general lack of political will (or interest) in Serbia toadvance reforms and introduce required change, this argument can also be presented onbehalf of the donors, reflected in several respects, including lack of consistency andcommon SSR strategy. As international attention is moving away from the WesternBalkans, so is investment into the region, including Serbia 6 . Countries which have been keystakeholders over the past decades are simply not prioritising Serbia as they once did, whichis certainly having a negative impact, as desirable reforms did not take place when initiallyexpected or planned.Serbia is not an aid-dependent country in terms of the level of assistance received.However, in terms of effect, external assistance has a very important role to play within thereform process, including SSR. Considering the current financial crisis and the significantreduction in the amount of assistance received from the EU in the form of Instruments forPre-Accession Assistance (IPA), the role of other bilateral and multilateral assistance will2 The Lisbon Treaty, as it will become known after its formal signature in the Portuguese capital on 13December 2007, also further defines the 'Petersberg' tasks to include Joint Disarmament Operations and SecuritySector Reform.3 Chris Donnelly, ‘Learning for SSR in CE Europe’, in Alan Bryden & Heiner Hänggi, Reform andReconstruction of the Security Sector, DCAF 2004, p.47.4 For more on SSR and the first & second generation argument see Page 9, Footnote 13.5 This measurement is based on a fixed time frame and achieved outputs benchmarked against statedpolicy objectives. For a debate on measuring SSR progress, see Miroslav Hadžić, ’Measuring theextent of SSR in Serbia: Framing the problem’ in the Western Balkans Security Observer Issue 7-8,CCMR Belgrade 2007, Belgrade.6 It is interesting to note that Serbia has received a larger share than neighbouring countries in termsof donor assistance towards the public sector, but far less investment in the private sector, as thecountry is still seen as highly risky, especially in terms of bureaucracy and stable legislative grounding.2
increase further 7 . However, this has not been sufficiently understood within Serbia and thereis urgent need to tackle this problem, especially at central government level. This paper willgo a long way towards identifying key issues regarding this subject and provide somerecommendations towards addressing them.Under such circumstances, there is no doubt that reform is still externally driven, ‘topdown’,with the top represented by NATO, the EU, OSCE and other internationalstakeholders. However, there is scope to improve, as this paper will clearly identify. Althoughit has mixed results, conditionality has been the primary change management tool, and haslargely been misused, given that very little expected reform has taken place, according tothose providing assistance and, to some extent, declared domestic policy objectives.Most importantly, external assistance has focused mainly on projects, many of which arewithout a clear vision and implemented without coordination at the strategic level. 8 Hence,results achieved have been limited and far below both external expectations and thepotential that the country clearly possesses.The first section of this paper provides a short country context for Serbia and the factorswhich shape both the SSR environment and donor activities in this area. In this sense, anychange-management process that occurs (including those targeting stability anddevelopment) is heavily influenced by these underlying factors. This section targets theinfluence of the inherent intelligence setup, as well as governance issues, which underpin thewhole concept of reform in Serbia, including SSR. Furthermore, in an attempt to be asholistic as possible, this section also looks at the regional aspect and how Serbia fits into thepuzzle in a security context.The second section provides a short analysis of the development of SSR in Serbia over thepast 10 years. Considering the paper is primarily focused on the issue of donor assistance,focus will be on two areas of SSR where most donor assistance has been targeted duringthe above mentioned period, i.e. defence reform and police reform. Although SSR has to beviewed in a holistic way, experiences from these two areas in the form of lessons learned willbe sufficient to answer the key questions posed above.The third section provides an overview of all key stakeholders prevalent in Serbia andworking on SSR. For simplification, the paper presents a two-way division of stakeholders,with the domestic recipients labelled as the demand side and external donor community asthe supply side. Furthermore, the section looks at the question of change agents, in terms oftheir roles and modus operandi.The fourth section looks at the main question of the paper, the coordination andharmonisation of assistance, i.e. the interaction processes between the stakeholders and theimpact these processes have in terms of change (reform).The concluding part is kept short and is devoted solely to key recommendations flowingfrom the paper as a whole.7 Although nominally IPA funding will increase, Seriba is using significant portions of this funding formeeting current finalcial (budget) commitments, thus reducing amounts remaining for reform efforts.8 OSCE Law Enforcement Department ’List of project on police reform 2002-2008’.3
Page 1 and 2: The Defence Academy of the United K
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Page 17 and 18: needs to take this area more seriou
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Page 21 and 22: The Demand Side - Recipient IssuesT
Page 23 and 24: ground with sufficient expertise an
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Page 31 and 32: Conclusion and RecommendationsThe s
Page 33 and 34: Specific Recommendations11. DEFENCE
Page 35 and 36: 17. Timothy Edmunds, Security Secto
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