Security Sector Reform and Donor Assistance in Serbia - Defence ...

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in terms of the complex JHA arena. For example, police reform is as much about fightingorganised crime as it is about police accountability and human resources management, allclearly distinct fields, yet closely interlinked when we discuss change managementprocesses in this sector. While tackling any one of these areas is a huge undertaking andusually requires several donors, tackling all would require a holistic approach by a multitudeof stakeholders.Flowing from this is the observation that two groups of donors exist in Serbia when it comesto SSR. Countries which have been engaged in the development of the SSR conceptglobally (e.g. UK, Holland, Norway and Sweden) understand and attempt to use the conceptin its broader sense (OECD-DAC approach) locally and even going beyond to include relatedcross-government public reform issues. However, interviewed officials on the ground frommany other countries with less experience do not refer to SSR in such a holistic manner,seeing their role at a more tactical and operational level.Last but not least, donors must place more emphasis on their own assessment andevaluation processes when it comes to the implementation of programmes and projects.While it is good this is done in cooperation with the recipient country, in policy terms it shouldalso be done at least once a year by the donor at home. The employment of externalconsultants has its benefits, especially if proper Terms of Reference are applied, howeveralone they have little benefit. Scope must be left for the adequate application of their findingsand flexibility built into the system to address any inefficiency, which will almost always existdue to the nature of the process itself.It is expected that in the near future, donor assistance will become better scrutinised from thedonor’s own central audit authority 58 , as in many cases donations account for seriouspercentages of public spending, which is seriously being scrutinised under the currenteconomic crisis. Such a process will no doubt have a positive impact on donor assistance ingeneral, especially in terms of enforcing the Paris Declaration agreement mentioned above.Coordination by RecipientThis paper has made it clear that ultimate responsibility for coordination must rest with thedomestic recipient, in this case the government of Serbia. This is particularly important interms of the harmonisation of reform efforts. Considering harmonisation has an importantpolicy angle, it can best be achieved through strategic planning and management, i.e. theexistence of valid and usable strategic documents.As argued above, quality strategic documents 59 would clearly show the direction and depthof desired reform and would immensely benefit donor coordination. Without them, all thatremains are ad hoc and short-term objectives, often steered in politically opposing directions.Hence, the lack of adequate strategic documents is a failure on several fronts.Firstly, considering it is a top-down process, it demonstrates a lack of initiative and will forreal change in a systematic, cost-effective and sustainable way. Secondly, it shows a lack ofcapacity on behalf of the domestic institution(s) to initiate such processes in the appropriateway and produce quality documents. An example is the recently passed National Security58 An example from the UK could be engaging a trilateral (DFID, MOD, FCO) organisational unit withsufficient independent authority to provide evaluation in a holistic manner, at lest at country level, if notfrom regino to region. Another example could be the increased involvement of the National AuditOffice in the process of evaluation donor assistance.59 The question of the quality of strategic documents is an issue of concern, as they do exist but arenot being utilised, for a variety of reasons, such as: lack of top-down support, academic approach todrafting, minimal institutional ownership, bad communication etc.24
Strategy, which will do little to help neither improve donor coordination nor provide any realstrategic input into the process.Most importantly, it questions how SSR issues are identified and prioritised, i.e. who leadsthe reform process? These cannot be administered by bodies such as the National SecurityCouncil 60 alone, which are primarily meant to decide upon or give guidance on the mainstrategic policy directions. Thus, the role of such councils is not adequate for coordination ofdonor assistance.In defence reform, the PfP process does offer some assistance in strategic planning, but it isthe Membership Action Plan (MAP) that would ultimately aid the strategic approach todefence reform (SSR) in a holistic manner required, including coordination andharmonisation aspects. As Serbia is currently not looking at MAP and NATO membership,this is only an option for the medium term. However, EU documents do offer more directionto police reform, albeit in certain aspects, such as border control and organised crime, crucialwithin the context of its own JHA area.This paper asserts that less ‘politisation’ of the process, where Serbia is seen as a ‘special’case, would certainly aid a more qualitative process of reform in Serbia. The OSCE, while ismeant to have a significant role in coordination, especially with regards to police reform, isnot utilised at all, despite its comparative advantage in several respects, including availabilityof permanent expertise on the ground and ‘neutral’ status by representation of 56participating states, including those of the EU.Donor policies could be improved by increased coordination between different governmentaldepartments dealing with particular SSR elements in Serbia. However, this is not occurring atthe moment in any real sense, although it has been recognised as an issue and occasionaldiscussion does take place. A move forward in terms of process improvement would bethe creation of senior level cross-ministry working group to steer SSR coordinationamong key ministries (e.g. MoD, MoI, Ministry of Foreign Affairs), as well as theencouragement of more operational (mid-level) cooperation, which could greatly improvehorizontal linkages at a more expert-professional level, thus positively impacting knowledgebased decision-making and reform as such.An interesting point that differentiates Serbia from all other CE and SE European states isthat of NATO membership and the impact this has had on the SSR process. While othercountries underwent NATO’s Membership Action Plan exercise prior to becoming Alliancemembers, building up their capacity towards a strategic approach to SSR reform, Serbia hasso far lacked this experience. Moreover, it is more than likely to become the first country inthe region to become an EU applicant and member without moving closer towards NATOmembership.The Ministry of Finance has to date played a more systematic coordinating role, when itcomes to some bilateral donations (e.g. donations from Norway). However, while this iscertainly a welcome development in terms of positively impacting on duplication, it is drivenexternally and is project-based, with only limited scope to influence decision-making in thevarious ministries. Furthermore, it focuses on reform across government and there is littlescope and capacity to recognise SSR in a holistic manner.A good example is the current debate on engagement of Serbia's security forces in UNpeace support missions, with both the MoD and MoI leading their own, separatenegotiations, with almost minimal engagement from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and theMinistry of Finance. These latter two are in effect the most important players in the process,60 This body was formed in December 2007 and to date it is difficult to assess its impact. More detailsin Vladimir Cvijan, ‘Savet za nacionalnu analizu – pozitivnopravna analiza’, Srpska pravna revija br. 8(2008)25
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Page 9 and 10: epublics, making the post-conflict
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Page 13 and 14: Within months of Montenegro’s sep
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Page 17 and 18: needs to take this area more seriou
Page 19 and 20: Figure 1 - KEY STAKEHOLDERS IN THES
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Page 23 and 24: ground with sufficient expertise an
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Page 31 and 32: Conclusion and RecommendationsThe s
Page 33 and 34: Specific Recommendations11. DEFENCE
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