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An Introduction to Evolutionary Game Theory: Lecture 2 - School of ...

An Introduction to Evolutionary Game Theory: Lecture 2 - School of ...

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Influence <strong>of</strong> Fluctuations on <strong>Evolutionary</strong> Dynamics (I)(F A = 1 + ∑ N−1j=1 ∏j i=1f AiFixation ) Probabilities:−1and F B = F A ∏ N−1i=1f Bif Ai= 1 − w + w a(i−1)+b(N−i)N−1and f Bi(fBi/fiA ), with= 1 − w + w ci+d(N−i−1)N−1Does selection favour fixation <strong>of</strong> A? Yes, only if F A > 1/NIn the weak selection limit (w → 0):F A ≈N1 [1 −w6({a + 2b − c − 2d}N − {2a + b + c − 4d}) ] −1Thus, F A > 1/N if a(N − 2) + b(2N − 1) > c(N + 1) + 2d(N − 2)N = 2 b > cN = 3 a + 5b > 2(2c + d)N = 4 2a + 7b > 5c + 4d... ...N ≫ 1 a + 2b > c + 2dFor large N, F A > 1/N if a + 2b > c + 2dMauro Mobilia <strong>Evolutionary</strong> <strong>Game</strong> <strong>Theory</strong>: <strong>An</strong> <strong>Introduction</strong>, <strong>Lecture</strong> 2

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