An Introduction to Evolutionary Game Theory: Lecture 2 - School of ...
An Introduction to Evolutionary Game Theory: Lecture 2 - School of ...
An Introduction to Evolutionary Game Theory: Lecture 2 - School of ...
- No tags were found...
Create successful ePaper yourself
Turn your PDF publications into a flip-book with our unique Google optimized e-Paper software.
Replica<strong>to</strong>r Dynamics for 2 × 2 <strong>Game</strong>s (III)dxdt = x(1 − x)[µ B − (µ A + µ B )x]1µ A > 0 and µ B > 0: Hawk-Dove gamex ∗ =µ Bµ A +µis stable (attrac<strong>to</strong>r, ESS) interior FPB2µ A > 0 and µ B < 0: Prisoner’s DilemmaB always better <strong>of</strong>f, x ∗ = 0 is ESS3µ A < 0 and µ B < 0: Stag-Hunt <strong>Game</strong>Either A or B can be better <strong>of</strong>f, i.e. x ∗ = 0 and x ∗ = 1 are ESS.x ∗ =µ Bµ A +µis unstable FP (non-ESS)B4µ A < 0 and µ B > 0: Pure Dominance ClassA always better <strong>of</strong>f, x ∗ = 1 is ESSMauro Mobilia <strong>Evolutionary</strong> <strong>Game</strong> <strong>Theory</strong>: <strong>An</strong> <strong>Introduction</strong>, <strong>Lecture</strong> 2
Change language