Africa quarterly special on emerging powers.pdf - SAFPI

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A N A L Y S I SThere is growing demand for <strong>Africa</strong>’s natural resources from India and China. Photo: http://africaoil.ning.comadvantage in the medium to long term: its strong diasporiccommunity on the ground in <strong>Africa</strong>, its proximity to thecontinent, its use of historical ties and <strong>special</strong> niche areas topromote its cause of <strong>Africa</strong>n friendship, its first-classeducational system and its enduring democratic tradition willcontribute towards making it more competitive than China(Cheru and Obi 2011).Brazil and africaOf the three major emerging powers discussed here, Brazilis the least engaged in <strong>Africa</strong>. China’s role in <strong>Africa</strong> is nowwidely scrutinised. India’s presence in <strong>Africa</strong> is still a fringetopic, but an emerging group of analysts has begun to studyIndia’s presence systematically. Brazil on the other hand isnew, though its activities in <strong>Africa</strong> are arousing growing interestaround the world. Considering that Brazil does not needto import energy nor food, what are Brazil’s interests in <strong>Africa</strong>?Brazil’s historical origins owes much to <strong>Africa</strong>, in part dueto the role of the Atlantic slave trade and its role in the widercommercial network of the Portuguese empire. Until fairlyrecently, Brazilian foreign and economic policy’s historicalfocus on North America, Europe and South America hadrelegated ties with <strong>Africa</strong> to the margins. The mainconsequence of this lack of active engagement in <strong>Africa</strong> is thatBrazil has lagged behind China and India in formulating andimplementing a comprehensive <strong>Africa</strong> policy. Thus, althoughit is in the process of expanding its commercial and financialties, Brazil’s trade with <strong>Africa</strong> remains relatively low andfocused on only a few countries, while at the same time Brasiliahas actively sought to elevate and integrate <strong>Africa</strong> into itsglobal foreign policy.The evolution of Brazilian foreign policy over the last sixtyyears has produced differing policy approaches to <strong>Africa</strong>.However, there has been a continuum in Brazilian foreignpolicy towards <strong>Africa</strong> in terms of a commitment to respectingsovereignty and non-interference in domestic affairs.Underlying Brazil’s <strong>Africa</strong> policy is a desire to prioritiseBrazilian developmental and commercial aims in approachingthe continent while at the same time responding tobroader foreign policy ambitions. In the period between 1945and 1974, this manifested itself as a policy of general (thoughnot uniform) diplomatic support for French and Portuguesepositions in <strong>Africa</strong> in fora such as the United Nations. Thisapproach was guided in part by mercantilist needs of securingEuropean investment in the Brazilian economy as well asaccessing its markets, and culminated in particularly close tieswith Portuguese territories as well as strong trade ties withSouth <strong>Africa</strong> that practised apartheid.With the collapse of the Portuguese empire in <strong>Africa</strong>in the mid-1970s, Brazil reached out to the rest of <strong>Africa</strong>diplomatically but essentially remained confined in economicterms to Lusophone <strong>Africa</strong>, Nigeria and South <strong>Africa</strong>. WhilePresident Fernando Henarique Cardoso (1995-2002) set thestage for diversifying Brazil’s partnerships after the end of theCold War, it was President Lula (2003-2010) who made <strong>Africa</strong>a strategic priority (as part of a grand strategy to strengthenSouth-South Cooperation). The present government ofDilma Rousseff (since October 2010) also is activelyreversing the decline in ties under earlier predecessors andemphasizes Brazil and <strong>Africa</strong>’s shared historical standing asdeveloping countries. The Lula/Rousseff governments alsolaid emphasis on the cultural affinities of Brazilian societywith <strong>Africa</strong>, built on the shared experiences with Lusophone<strong>Africa</strong> and the influence of Brazilians of <strong>Africa</strong>n origin. It isnotable that Lula made 12 trips to <strong>Africa</strong>, visiting 21 countriesduring his presidency while Brazil received 47 visits of <strong>Africa</strong>n24August 2011-January 2012
A F R I C A Q U A R T E R L Ykings, presidents and prime ministers from 27 nations. Brazil’sForeign Minister Celso Amorim made 67 official visits to 34<strong>Africa</strong>n nations during his time with the Lula government.Brazil now has 37 embassies in <strong>Africa</strong> (much more than thatof India), up from 17 in 2002.A key aim of Brazilian foreign policy under Lula da Silvahad been to ‘reduce Brazilian vulnerability on the internationalstage’ by engaging in a more ‘muscular foreign policy’ topursue its interests. With respect to <strong>Africa</strong> this has meant thatBrazilian foreign policy has rediscovered its ‘<strong>Africa</strong>n vocation’,framing it within this broader concern of respondingmore effectively to globalisation. Brazil’s <strong>Africa</strong> policy reflectsthis impulse in that the most significant diplomatic initiativesthat involve <strong>Africa</strong> are multilateral while the substance of economicactivity is played out at the bilateral level. A key initiativeis the IBSA (India, Brazil, South <strong>Africa</strong>) initiative, a diplomaticpartnership initially focused onmutual support for a position in areformed UN Security Council.This multilateral approach has beenexpanded into other areas: theCommunity of Portuguese SpeakingCountries (CPLP) has becomeanother global diplomatic vehicle forextending Brazilian influence acrossLusophone <strong>Africa</strong>. Private Braziliancommercial interests are active primarilyin Angola, Mozambique and South <strong>Africa</strong> whileBrazilian multinationals have also made concerted efforts tobreak into areas such as Gabon and Nigeria. In Angola, forinstance, Brazil’s two-way trade has jumped to over $1 billionin 2007 and the country is a leading destination for Brazilianinvestment in <strong>Africa</strong>, receiving $750 million in 2006 alone.Brazilian enterprises, mostly through the activity of largeprivate firms such as Vale and Odebrechts, initially enteredthe <strong>Africa</strong>n market without significant Brazilian governmentsupport. The Brazilian mining giant, Vale, convincedCompared to actors likeChina and the UnitedStates, the EU approachto engaging <strong>Africa</strong>represents a morebalanced understandingof <strong>Africa</strong>’s needsIndia’s Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, South <strong>Africa</strong>’s President Jacob Zuma andBrazilian President Dilma Rousseff at the 5th IBSA Summit in Pretoria, South <strong>Africa</strong>,on October 18, 2011.President Lula to lobby the president of Gabon directly tosupport its iron ore lease, citing the Chinese approach oflinking state diplomacy with commercial interests; thus anew form of direct political engagement to Brazil’s approachto <strong>Africa</strong> has emerged. Moreover, state firms such asPetrobas are embarking on joint ventures in <strong>Africa</strong>, withPetrobas and Angola’s state-owned oil company Sonangolexploring training and cooperation in exploration of oil.As Brazil’s economic engagement in <strong>Africa</strong> grows, the way<strong>Africa</strong>ns see Brazil will inevitably change. While its presenceis still much smaller than that of China and India, Brazil mustbe careful to avoid some of the mistakes made by China thatmay run the risk of facing regional backlashes. Many are of theopinion that Brazilians are well liked across <strong>Africa</strong>. Nowthe challenge is to assure that even despite ever greaterinvestments, such as Vale’s recently signed $1 billion deal tobuild a railway in Malawi to transportcoal from Mozambique, Brazil willcontinue to be seen as a partner, andnot a coloniser that merely seeks toexploit <strong>Africa</strong>’s resources.policy implicationS andimperativeSIt may be justifiably said that thenew scramble for <strong>Africa</strong> could be asruinous to <strong>Africa</strong> as the earlierscrambles unless effective corrective measures are taken.Although it is true that China has successfully implementedan alternative development path, which may have moredevelopmental possibilities for the <strong>Africa</strong>n continent, it isimportant to note that the promise will be realised only if<strong>Africa</strong>ns do not become complicit with the Chineseagendas, but are able to play off the competitors for <strong>Africa</strong>’sresources with a view to maximising the benefits for thecontinent. <strong>Africa</strong> needs to transform the ‘resource curse’ intoa vector for socio-economic development. This requires astrategic engagement and a set of actionsdesigned specifically to enhance the leverageof <strong>Africa</strong>n countries in their relations withChina, India and other traditional andemerging powers.The last time such a scramble took place —during the Cold War — the consequences weredevastating for the <strong>Africa</strong>n continent. Bothforeign powers — the United States and theSoviet Union — established client regimes,funded rebel armies and engaged in proxy wars.The result was a continent wracked by civilwars, displacement of citizens and cross-borderrefugee flows. The competitive internationalenvironment during the Cold War did notbenefit <strong>Africa</strong>. The current conflict situationssuch as in Sudan, DRC and Somalia couldproduce similar situations elsewhere on theAugust 2011-January 2012 25
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