Feudal Forces: Democratic Nations - Police Accountability in

FEUDAL FORCES: DEMOCRATIC NATIONSEmerging good practicePrior to 2002, the legal basis of policing in Pakistan was similar to India andBangladesh, as it shared the same founding 1861 police law. The Pakistan PoliceOrder of 2002 brought in a fresh wave of reform. This law as amended in 2004clearly defines “superintendence” to mean “supervision of Police … through policy,oversight and guidance and specifies that while exercising it, the government mustensure “total autonomy” of the chief of police in “operational, administrative andfinancial matters”. 97 It also states that the power of superintendence “shall be soexercised as to ensure that police performs its duties efficiently and strictly inaccordance with law”. 98 By clearly defining the scope and meaning of the termsuperintendence by state governments, the 2002 Pakistan law aims to checkillegitimate political interference with the working of the police in the name ofexercising their powers of superintendence.The 1978 Constitution reconstituted the Public Service Commission, but only as an institutionsubordinate to the Cabinet, the Commission losing the independence that it enjoyed under theSoulbury Constitution. The Cabinet reserved to itself powers of control over the senior-gradeofficers and delegated powers over the other officers to the Commission. However, the Cabinetfurther directed the Commission to delegate even these powers to Secretaries of Ministries andto Heads of Departments. Consequently, the Commission had no original powers of its ownand it derived only appellate powers granted directly by the Constitution. However, after muchpressure, the Cabinet agreed that a Secretary to a Ministry, who was a nominee of the Minister,might be susceptible to political influence and the Commission withdrew the powers delegatedto the Secretaries from February 1992. 99 In 2001, the 17 th amendment to the Constitutioncreated a separate and independent National Police Commission to check illegitimate politicalinterference but the executive has subverted even that process by manipulating the appointmentsto the Commission (as described in Chapter 5).Curbing political interference: reform initiativesin the regionThe response to the cry for better policing is a telling marker of the political will to reformand the levels of resistance encountered. Across the region, reform commissions have clearlypointed out political interference as a problem and suggested ways to overcome. None ofthe recommendations were implemented until 2001, when Sri Lanka made the first movetowards reform, followed by Pakistan in 2002.Pakistan and Sri Lanka are the only countries in the region that have undertaken legislativereform to check illegitimate political interference. While Sri Lanka created the NationalPolice Commission as a civilian oversight structure to govern the police in an independentand transparent manner, Pakistan brought in a new police law. Although the structuresestablished by these legislative reforms have been criticised either for their limited mandateor for the lack of their effectiveness, there is no denying the fact that even these structures, ifimplemented properly, could go a long way in checking political interference with the workingof the police.Implementation requires political will: Pakistan – acase study44 :: POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY IN SOUTH ASIAThe Pakistan Police Order of 2002 established specific institutions to curb illegitimate politicalinterference and ensure police accountability. It provided that the appointments of the headsof the police organisation at the provincial and the district level would be more transparentand that they would enjoy security of tenure. Public Safety Commissions were required to be