Feudal Forces: Democratic Nations - Police Accountability in

FEUDAL FORCES: DEMOCRATIC NATIONS72 :: POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY IN SOUTH ASIAApart from financial resources, the lack of human resources also impacts on the efficiencyof commissions in South Asia. Addressing human rights violations by the police requiresstrong investigative skills and it is not easy to find trained civilian investigators in the region.Using investigators who are not properly trained can result in justice being denied to thepublic. For example, in a particular case in Sri Lanka in 2003, a coordinator of the Commissionfound allegations of torture of a minor to be false. Following international criticism, anindependent inquiry was instituted by the Commission to review this case, which found thatthe coordinator in charge of an entire province did not have the competence and training toconduct such inquiries. 186 In such cases where skilled investigators are lacking, a Commissionmay second police officers solely for the purposes of investigations. However, much carehas to be taken to ensure that these officers have some background in human rights andthat further periodic training is provided to them. Without civilian superiority in staffing, theperceived bias that police personnel may have can offset the benefits of their investigativeskills. In India, the appointment of a former chief of a federal police force as a member ofthe Commission raised many eyebrows and a public interest case was filed in the SupremeCourt on this issue.Another major obstacle to effective functioning of the Commissions is police resistance, whichmanifests in a lack of police cooperation or police intimidation. For example, in Sri Lanka,several staff of the Commission were threatened and manhandled by police officers in June2004, when they visited the Payagala police station to investigate complaints of torture. 187To ensure that governments do not ignore Commission recommendations, the laws in Indiaand Sri Lanka provide that the Government or the head of the institution to which therecommendations have been made must provide an action taken report within a specifiedtime. In Sri Lanka, if the Commission does not receive this action taken report or if it considersthe report to be inadequate, it is empowered to “make a full report of the facts to thePresident who shall cause the report to be laid before the Parliament.” In India, the inquiryreports are published and the law mandates the government to lay the report in the parliament“along with a memorandum of action taken or proposed to be taken… and the reasons fornon-acceptance of the recommendations, if any.” 188 However the lack of political will meansthat the state governments refuse to comply with its recommendations “by simply ignoringthem or by furnishing a long bureaucratic discourse on how compliance with therecommendations is not in public interest (read governmental interest)”. 189 In many cases,there may be partial compliance 190 or delayed compliance. The Indian Commission, however,is also empowered to approach the Supreme Court and the High Courts for appropriatedirections and writs, and it has done this on a few occasions. 191OmbudsmanIn its traditional form, the Ombudsman is an office headed by an independent high-levelpublic official, who receives complaints about injustice and maladministration committed bygovernment agencies, officials or employees. Most offices of the Ombudsman around theCommonwealth remain focused on this traditional role, but increasingly, they are expandingtheir scope to deal with a broader range of issues, including human rights and corruption,and also becoming more significant actors in oversight of the police.Except for Maldives and Bangladesh, 192 all the other countries in the region have anOmbudsman, but they are not perceived as strong oversight institutions, especially with respectto police misconduct. India does not have an Ombudsman at the national level and mostprovincial ones (Lokayuktas) have no jurisdiction over senior India Police Service officers. 193Even where Lokayuktas do have such powers, 194 governments and the police departmentsroutinely ignore their recommendations. In Pakistan, the federal Ombudsman has jurisdictionover federal law enforcement agencies, whereas the four provincial Ombudsman offices havejurisdiction over their respective provincial police forces. However, their powers to investigatethe police are regarded weak and the police rarely accept their recommendations.In Sri Lanka, the Constitution 195 empowers the Ombudsman or the Office of the ParliamentaryCommissioner for Administration 196 to investigate and report upon cases of infringement of