Volume 5 Winter 2011 Number 2 - Charleston Law Review

CHARLESTON LAW REVIEW [Volume 5same Court in the same term beat a hasty retreat. It appearsthat the Court is obscuring facts in order to reach a preconceivedconclusion.In addition, by holding that the property of the debtor is aninterest, thereby narrowing the scope of notice, the Court alsodoes damage to the concept of a fresh start. 241 Because theproperty is bifurcated, the thirty-day notice only applies to theportion claimed as exempt by the debtor, and puts no timerestraint to objecting to the valuation of the property until thedebtor has received a discharge. 242 This uncertainty may causedebtors problems reorganizing and starting anew because, asJustice Ginsburg points out, the debtor may not be able to accepta job that requires transportation if the debtor does not know ifthe debtor’s car will be taken. 243VI. CONCLUSIONThe United States Supreme Court has spoken. It is not clearwhether the issue has been laid to rest. Time, of course, will tell.Yet, it appears that Mullane is the standard for determiningwhether a creditor is deemed to have received notice inbankruptcy cases—at least with respect to issues that mighthave been resolved in an adversary proceeding but were not, andwhere the creditor had actual notice that it should take steps toprotect its rights. 244 Whether this case will affect otherbankruptcy proceedings is not clear. Whether these principleswill be applied further outside of a bankruptcy context is alsounclear.What is clear is that creditors have been put on notice—although notice requirements may not have been complied withlegally, that is, in full compliance with the provisions of thebankruptcy laws—if they actually know that a debtor has filedbankruptcy, they should diligently proceed to protect their226241. Id. at ___, 130 S. Ct. at 2674–75.242. See id.243. Id. at ___, 130 S. Ct. at 2674.244. Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950).