13.07.2015 Views

civil liability of good samaritans and volunteers - Law Reform ...

civil liability of good samaritans and volunteers - Law Reform ...

civil liability of good samaritans and volunteers - Law Reform ...

SHOW MORE
SHOW LESS

You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles

YUMPU automatically turns print PDFs into web optimized ePapers that Google loves.

(d)Economic Arguments2.72 In Stovin v Wise, 118 Lord H<strong>of</strong>fmann stated that a legal obligation toundertake a rescue could amount to the state appropriating the citizen‟sresources without compensation. In other areas <strong>of</strong> tort law, price deterrencehas been established as a ground for the imposition <strong>of</strong> <strong>liability</strong> on a person whocauses loss or damage to others. 119 If a person is held liable for the damage<strong>and</strong> loss that they cause to others, this person will eventually refrain fromcarrying out the harmful activity. 120 As Lord H<strong>of</strong>fmann pointed out in Stovin v.Wise, the efficient allocation <strong>of</strong> resources usually requires an activity shouldbear its own costs. He considered that if an activity were able to benefit frombeing able to impose some <strong>of</strong> its costs on other people, or „externalities‟ as theyare economically termed, the market would be distorted because the activitywould appear cheaper than it really is. Thus, <strong>liability</strong> to pay compensation forloss caused by negligent conduct acts as a deterrent against increasing the cost<strong>of</strong> the activity to the community. But there is no similar justification for requiringa person who is not doing anything to spend money on behalf <strong>of</strong> someone else.Lord H<strong>of</strong>fmann noted that except in special cases (such as marine salvage) thecommon law does not reward someone who voluntarily confers a benefit onanother. So there must be some special reason why he should have to put hish<strong>and</strong> in his pocket. It would seem that Lord H<strong>of</strong>fmann based his conclusionshere on the fact that inaction does not cause harm. If this had not been thecase then Lord H<strong>of</strong>fmann‟s argument might easily be extended to justify theimposition <strong>of</strong> the cost <strong>of</strong> harm on the person whose failure to act had “caused”it.(e)Altruism2.73 Another argument involved relates to the principle <strong>of</strong> altruism. AsWeinrib has noted, “the problem <strong>of</strong> rescue is a central issue in the controversyabout the relationship between law <strong>and</strong> morality”. 121 The basic theory <strong>of</strong>altruism shows that persons are morally bound to assist one another. A GoodSamaritan is generally, therefore, said to act out <strong>of</strong> the kindness in his or herheart. The Commission considers that a positive legal duty to intervene toassist another, therefore, would run counter to this principle, although it acceptsthat, in some instances the law can impose a duty to behave in an altruistic118119120121[1996] 3 All ER 801 at 819.See Kortmann Altruism in Private <strong>Law</strong> (Oxford University Press 2005) at 18- 23.See Calabresi “Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution <strong>and</strong> the <strong>Law</strong> <strong>of</strong> Torts” (1961)70 Yale LJ 499.Weinrib, The Case for a Duty to Rescue, 90 Yale L.J. 247, 293 (1980).42

Hooray! Your file is uploaded and ready to be published.

Saved successfully!

Ooh no, something went wrong!