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civil liability of good samaritans and volunteers - Law Reform ...

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(g)Indeterminate Number <strong>of</strong> ClaimsIn Donoghue v Stevenson 127 Lord Atkin pointed out that to create a positive dutyto intervene could create a situation in which innumerable claims could arise.He pointed out that the common law had, for this reason, developed rules whichlimit the range <strong>of</strong> complainants <strong>and</strong> their remedies. In addition, the Commissionbelieves that, were moral wrongdoing to be a cause <strong>of</strong> action, there could wellbe numerous types <strong>of</strong> damage which might be difficult or even impossible toquantify. Certainly, what one person considers immoral or wrong, anotherperson might not. In this regard, enforcing moral obligations could lead to muchuncertainty in the law. In particular, it has been argued that the recognition <strong>of</strong>moral obligations as valid legal claims would destabilise written law by replacingit with the varied morals <strong>of</strong> those sitting on the bench. 128(h)Several Tortfeasors / „Why Pick on Me?‟ Argument2.76 Lord H<strong>of</strong>fmann in Stovin v Wise stated that:“[a] duty to prevent harm to others or to render assistance to aperson in danger or distress may apply to a large <strong>and</strong> indeterminateclass <strong>of</strong> people who happen to be able to do something. Why shouldone be held liable rather than the other?” 1292.77 The Commission considers this to be a compelling argument in casesinvolving nonfeasance or passive inaction. The Commission believes that theargument that each <strong>of</strong> the spectators is equally to blame where none <strong>of</strong> themacted is an important one. Furthermore, unlike the situation involvingmisfeasance, in cases <strong>of</strong> nonfeasance it will be difficult to identify who exactly isresponsible for the harm which has occurred. 130 As noted in the ConsultationPaper, 131 cases <strong>of</strong> inaction do not afford the opportunity to analyse whoseinaction is most responsible for the harm.2.78 The Commission acknowledges, however, the argument that thedifficulties posed by the “Why pick on me?” argument are no less surmountablethan those posed by ordinary negligence cases involving many tortfeasors. 132In those cases, while the victim has the right to only one recovery, each127128129130131132[1932] AC 562.Union Pacific Railway Co. v Cappier 72 P. 281 at 283. (Kan. 1903).[1996] 3 All ER 801.Kortmann Altruism in Private <strong>Law</strong> (Oxford University Press 2005) at 16-17.Weinrib “The Case for a Duty to Rescue” (1980) 90 Yale LJ 247 at 262.LRC CP 47-2007 at paragraph 2.45.Weinrib “The Case for a Duty to Rescue” (1980) 90 Yale LJ 247 at 26244

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