Stability and Robustness: Reliability in the World of Uncertainty

Forming a coalition, bansProblemFormulationStability andAccuracyFunctionsLet s be a number of coalitions in the game and letJ := (J 1 , J 2 , ..., J s ) be a set of coalitions formed. Let alsoX Jr := ∏j∈J rX j , J r ∈ J, r ∈ N s .be a set of strategy combinations accessible by coalition J r .The set of strategy combinations accessible by coalition J r ,with respect to the set of banned strategies B r , is defined as:X BrJ r:= X Jr \B r , J r ∈ J, r ∈ N s .Thus for a m-player s-coalition game with coalition profile(J 1 , J 2 , ..., J s ) and ban profile B := (B 1 , B 2 , ..., B s ), a set ofsolutions is defined as:X := ∏XJ Brr.r∈N sSensitivity Analysis in Game Theory Yury Nikulin - p. 5/29