Stability and Robustness: Reliability in the World of Uncertainty

Special casesProblemFormulationStability andAccuracyFunctionsObviously, if J = ({1}, {2}, ..., {m}) and B r = ∅ for all r ∈ N m(m coalitions, each coalition has one member, no bans), thenthe concept of J-equilibrium transforms into the well-knowconcept of the Nash equilibrium. On the other hand, ifJ = ({1, 2, ..., m}) and B = (∅) (one coalition that contains allplayers, no bans), then the concept of J-equilibrium transformsinto the well-know concept of the Pareto efficiency or Paretoequilibrium.For the game with matrix C, we denote PE m (C, X) andNE m (C, X) the set of Pareto and Nash equilibria, respectively.Sensitivity Analysis in Game Theory Yury Nikulin - p. 8/29