in economics in which social identity theory might prove especially valuable is the economics oforganizations. Our results suggest that instead of modeling identity as a substitute for monetary rewards<strong>and</strong> thus a cost-saving device, a more prominent effect of identity is the increased likelihoodof SWM actions <strong>and</strong> positive reciprocity.A second contribution of this paper is its practical implications for organizational design. Inneoclassical economics, the traditional approach to mechanism design relies heavily on incentivesderived from Taylorism. However, this theory is silent about whether a deep sense of identityamong employees within the firm is a worthwhile investment. Despite this lack, examples of identitycreation abound. Nike founder Phil Knight <strong>and</strong> many of his employees have tattoos of the Nike“swoosh” logo on their left calves as a sign of group membership <strong>and</strong> camaraderie (Camerer <strong>and</strong>Malmendier 2005). St<strong>and</strong>ard economic theory does not have an explanation for such phenomena.Our results suggest that creating a group identity would induce people to be more helpful to eachother, <strong>and</strong> to increase the likelihood of SWM actions, which would improve payoffs for all relevantparties, the principal (firm) as well as the agents (workers). The use of social identity as a designtool is a promising direction of research, especially in environments where monetary incentives arelimited, such as online communities (Ren, Kraut <strong>and</strong> Kiesler 2006).There are several directions for fruitful future research. On the theory front, a formalizationof identity <strong>and</strong> its applications to various domains of organization design would help us betterunderst<strong>and</strong> the effect of social identity on optimal contract <strong>and</strong> organizational hierarchies. Onthe empirical front, it would be interesting to explore the impact of social identity in practicalmechanism design in the laboratory <strong>and</strong> the field.20
APPENDIX A. Sequential Games with Self-Other AllocationsIngroup Outgroup ControlTwo-person dictator gamesB chooses Left Right Left Right Left RightDict 1 (400,400) vs. (750,400) 0.28 0.73 0.4 0.6 0.33 0.67Dict 2 (400,400) vs. (750,375) 0.63 0.37 0.63 0.37 0.82 0.18Dict 3 (300,600) vs. (700,500) 0.67 0.33 0.92 0.08 0.76 0.24Dict 4 (200,700) vs. (600,600) 0.33 0.68 0.65 0.35 0.5 0.5Dict 5 (0,800) vs. (400,400) 0.59 0.41 0.77 0.23 0.64 0.36Two-person response games: Bs payoffs identicalA stays out If A enters, B chooses Out Enter Left Right Out Enter Left Right Out Enter Left RightResp 1a (750,0) (400,400) vs. (750,400) 0.46 0.54 0.35 0.65 0.67 0.33 0.55 0.45 0.29 0.71 0.32 0.68Resp 1b (550,550) (400,400) vs. (750,400) 0.7 0.3 0.45 0.55 0.83 0.18 0.55 0.45 0.7 0.3 0.39 0.61Resp 6 (100, 1000) (75,125) vs. (125,125) 0.3 0.7 0.2 0.8 0.28 0.73 0.4 0.6 0.3 0.7 0.35 0.65Resp 7 (450,900) (200,400) vs. (400,400) 0.95 0.05 0.1 0.9 0.88 0.13 0.3 0.7 0.83 0.17 0.13 0.87Two-person response games: Bs sacrifice helps AA stays out If A enters, B chooses Out Enter Left Right Out Enter Left Right Out Enter Left RightResp 2a (750,0) (400,400) vs. (750,375) 0.28 0.72 0.72 0.28 0.62 0.38 0.85 0.15 0.59 0.41 0.73 0.27Resp 2b (550,550) (400,400) vs. (750,375) 0.8 0.2 0.72 0.28 0.83 0.18 0.82 0.18 0.95 0.05 0.64 0.36Resp 3 (750,100) (300,600) vs. (700,500) 0.68 0.33 0.42 0.58 0.83 0.18 0.71 0.29 0.82 0.18 0.55 0.45Resp 4 (700,200) (200,700) vs. (600,600) 0.49 0.51 0.26 0.74 0.85 0.15 0.54 0.46 0.55 0.45 0.23 0.77Resp 5a (800,0) (0,800) vs. (400,400) 0.78 0.23 0.38 0.62 0.9 0.1 0.56 0.44 0.81 0.19 0.45 0.55Resp 5b (0,800) (0,800) vs. (400,400) 0 1 0.5 0.5 0 1 0.7 0.3 0 1 0.64 0.36Resp 8 (725,0) (400,400) vs. (750,375) 0.65 0.35 0.7 0.3 0.8 0.2 0.78 0.23 0.74 0.26 0.83 0.17Resp 9 (450,0) (350,450) vs. (450,350) 0.63 0.38 0.68 0.33 0.83 0.18 0.75 0.25 0.74 0.26 0.87 0.13Two-person response games Bs sacrifice hurts AA stays out If A enters, B chooses Out Enter Left Right Out Enter Left Right Out Enter Left RightResp 10 (375, 1000) (400,400) vs. (350,350) 0.43 0.58 0.97 0.03 0.23 0.78 0.95 0.05 0.38 0.62 0.95 0.05Resp 11 (400, 1200) (400,200) vs. (0,0) 0.79 0.21 0.97 0.03 0.64 0.36 0.9 0.1 0.82 0.18 0.91 0.09Resp 12 (375, 1000) (400,400) vs. (250,350) 0.5 0.5 0.9 0.1 0.4 0.6 0.78 0.23 0.22 0.78 0.96 0.04Resp 13a (750,750) (800,200) vs. (0,0) 0.88 0.13 0.98 0.03 0.78 0.23 0.88 0.13 0.83 0.17 0.91 0.09Resp 13b (750,750) (800,200) vs. (0,50) 0.83 0.18 0.93 0.08 0.73 0.28 0.8 0.2 0.74 0.26 0.83 0.17Resp 13c (750,750) (800,200) vs. (0,100) 0.85 0.15 0.88 0.13 0.8 0.2 0.7 0.3 0.78 0.22 0.78 0.22Resp 13d (750,750) (800,200) vs. (0,150) 0.85 0.15 0.75 0.25 0.85 0.15 0.65 0.35 0.87 0.13 0.91 0.0921
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