Group Identity and Social Preferences

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Matching ConditionsAlternative Hypotheses and P-valuesIngroup Outgroup Control Ingr > Outgr Ingr > Contr Contr > OutgrPlayer A 0.629 0.509 0.57 0.000 0.047 0.048[676] [676] [381]Player B 0.68 0.529 0.638 0.000 0.095 0.001[790] [790] [447]Over all 0.656 0.520 0.606 0.000 0.022 0.000[1466] [1466] [828]Notes:1. Games Dict 5, Resp 5a and 5b and role B in game Resp 9 are excluded, as all outcomes yield the sameaggregate payoff.2. Number of observations is in square brackets.3. P-values are computed based on standard errors clustered at the individual level.Table 5: Proportion of SWM Decisions and the Effects of Social Identity36
Dependent Variable:Prob(B Choosing SWM action)Control Treatment Treatment Treatment Treatment(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)Ingr match 0.183 0.113 0.116 0.151(0.024)*** (0.036)*** (0.038)*** (0.037)***(Ingr match)*(# lines) 0.008(0.003)**(Ingr match)*(# words) 0.0014(0.0006)**(Ingr match)* 0.007(self-reported attach.) (0.008)Gain in self benefit 0.194 0.323 0.324 0.326 0.318(0.065)*** (0.045)*** (0.046)*** (0.046)*** (0.045)***Gain in social benefit 0.072 0.057 0.057 0.056 0.057(0.021)*** (0.013)*** (0.013)*** (0.013)*** (0.013)***Payoff gap when behind -0.120 -0.122 -0.122 -0.122 -0.121the match (0.021)*** (0.014)*** (0.014)*** (0.014)*** (0.014)***Good intentionality 0.092 -0.010 -0.006 -0.009 -0.006(0.061) (0.038) (0.039) (0.038) (0.038)Bad intentionality 0.156 -0.032 -0.026 -0.031 -0.021(0.087)* (0.057) (0.057) (0.057) (0.057)Constant 0.062 0.130 0.126 0.132 0.124(0.095) (0.057)** (0.057)** (0.057)** (0.058)**Observations 447 1580 1580 1580 1566Pseudo R-square 0.190 0.204 0.208 0.208 0.207Notes:1. Coefficients are probability derivatives.2. Non-index variables are measured in unit of 100 tokens.3. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the individual level.4. Significant at: * 10% level; ** 5% level; *** 1% level.Table 6: Logit Analysis on B’s Likelihood of Choosing SWM Actions37
Page 1 and 2: Group Identity and Social Preferenc
Page 3 and 4: ehavior. Deviations from the prescr
Page 5 and 6: identity strength on cooperative be
Page 7 and 8: In our study, the stage of other-ot
Page 9 and 10: while ρ(1 + a) measures the charit
Page 11 and 12: Support. In Table 2, column 5 prese
Page 13 and 14: when A is an outgroup match. When A
Page 15 and 16: compared to outgroup matching, incr
Page 17 and 18: By Result 5, we reject Hypothesis 6
Page 19 and 20: induced identity, when matched with
Page 21 and 22: APPENDIX A. Sequential Games with S
Page 23 and 24: Based on your choices, you prefer t
Page 25 and 26: [New Screen]Please record your deci
Page 27 and 28: [New Screen, Game 1, Player A]In th
Page 29 and 30: [New Screen, Game 3, Player B]In th
Page 31 and 32: Appendix C. Post-Experiment Survey(
Page 33 and 34: Session # Treatment or Control Game
Page 35: Dependent Variables Prob(B rewards
Page 39 and 40: Tokens3503002502001501005000 1 2 3
Page 41 and 42: ReferencesAkerlof, George and Rache

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