Reforming the United Nations for Peace and Security

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Third, I suspect that Annan’s sense that the UN has come to a “fork in theroad” is quite right, and possibly in more ways than he intended. If it isevident that central institutions of the UN are largely nonfunctionalartifacts of a completely different era, living on for the sake of habit,sinecures, and an appealing but faded dream, then calls for more radicalreform of the UN are likely to gain ground in the US and possibly othermajor supporters in the coming years. 95 The logical conclusion, consistentwith the Report’s own analysis, will be that it is time for a new “foundingmoment.” Supporters of the appealing dream envisioned in the 1947Charter might do better to try to get ahead of the whirlwind, by settingthe agenda for structural reform themselves.In paragraph 291, the Panel suggests that “In the longer term, MemberStates should consider upgrading the [Human Rights] Commission tobecome a ëHuman Rights Council’ that is no longer subsidiary to theEconomic and Social Council but a Charter body standing alongside it andthe Security Council ...” This paragraph hints at the kind of thinking aboutstructural reform I would like to have seen more of.SECURITY COUNCIL REFORMThe impetus for Annan’s creation of the Panel was the intense division andacrimony on the Security Council in the lead-up to the Iraq war. Thesewere so strong that many observers raised doubts about the prospects ofthe UN as a whole.It is fascinating, then, that the Panel’s reply amounts to a ringingendorsement and defense of the Security Council as the best hope for thefuture of collective security. The tacit dialogue with the Bushadministration is particularly interesting:95 I could well be wrong, but I would guess that this will be true regardless of which partyholds the US presidency.94
• The Panel flatly rejects the argument that Article 51 (which saysthat force may be used in self-defense, without prior SecurityCouncil authorization) should be interpreted to cover preventiveaction against a state suspected of illegally developing nuclearweapons that might be passed to terrorists. The report arguesthat “if there are good arguments for preventive military action,with good evidence to support them, they should be put to theSecurity Council” (para. 189). If the Security Council does not buythe arguments, then “by definition” there is time to pursue otherstrategies, since the threat is not the “imminent” kind covered byArticle 51. This argument basically fails to engage the concern ofthe Bush administration, that we are in a new world now in whichthe risk of nuclear terrorism does not allow states to “wait andsee” as much as they could in the past. Given that concern, theargument can only be compelling if we can reasonably expect theSecurity Council to be more willing to authorize preventive use offorce than in the past. The Panel gives a second argument that is,in my view, somewhat stronger. Namely, “For those impatientwith such a response,” it is simply not in the enlightened selfinterestof the US to undertake unauthorized preventive attacks,since “Allowing one to so act is to allow all” (para. 191). The Panelmight have added that unauthorized preventive strikes by the USare likely to increase middle-power incentives for developingnuclear weapons capabilities, thus increasing the risk of nuclearterrorism.• The Panel is impressed and pleased by the breadth of theauthority available to the Security Council under Chapter VII of theCharter. Since the SC can declare whatever it wants to be a “threatto international peace and security,” this gives the UN and theinternational system a politically feasible route to gain legalauthorization for action against the array of new threatsappearing in the 21st century (para. 194). This observation seemsto be the basis for the core strategy of the Panel: the hope that arenewed Security Council and Secretariat can effectively tackle thediverse challenges detailed in the first two sections of the report.95
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Reformingthe United Nationsfor Peac
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ContentsWorkshop ParticipantsvAckno
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ParticipantsWorkshop on United Nati
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Michael ReismanMyres S. McDougal Pr
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OverviewErnesto ZedilloDirector, Ya
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The important decision to make Secu
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member of the Panel’s Secretariat
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the new permanent members with a cl
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A model for a Security Council with
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criteria are intended not just to l
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TERRORISMThe Panel report urges the
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Participants also questioned the va
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FINAL CONSIDERATIONSThe High-level
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Promoting Democracy through Interna
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law—can channel internal dissent
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Many others had differences with th
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THE BEST KEPT SECRET: THE COMMUNITY
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Unfortunately, the Seoul Conference
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The important point is that the abi
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government by the Group’s most po
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Ministerial Meeting, the Convening
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2. Private foundations whose missio
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APPENDIX TO “PROMOTING DEMOCRACY
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The Report of the High-level Panel
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threats”. 28 So vulnerable indeed
Page 55 and 56: that the UN might be “facing a fo
Page 57 and 58: aw distributions of power and make
Page 59 and 60: Security Council. One of the Commis
Page 61 and 62: The second message of the report st
Page 63 and 64: vote of this member with veto power
Page 65 and 66: GOVERNANCE IN THE ECONOMIC DOMAINWh
Page 67 and 68: Comments on the Report of the High-
Page 69 and 70: ecommendations would also have the
Page 71 and 72: PANEL RECOMMENDATIONS ON ECONOMIC A
Page 73 and 74: What is worse is that almost an exc
Page 75 and 76: The conceptual underpinning of the
Page 77 and 78: such an eventuality; and to assist
Page 79 and 80: But it compromises on its own presc
Page 81 and 82: The UN represents the highest level
Page 83 and 84: The European Union in the United Na
Page 85 and 86: In the UN, the European Common Fore
Page 87 and 88: egard to resolutions put to a vote
Page 89 and 90: The European Commission cautiously
Page 91 and 92: The Group of Eastern European State
Page 93 and 94: “respect … for international la
Page 95 and 96: political declarations, especially
Page 97 and 98: marginalization. If the Security Co
Page 99 and 100: growth, the success of the democrat
Page 101 and 102: Comments on the Report of the High-
Page 103 and 104: • Regarding ECOSOC, the report ob
Page 105: cause of international peace and se
Page 109 and 110: In Model A, six of the nine new sea
Page 111 and 112: The Model A version of the new SC w
Page 113 and 114: Increased legitimacy helps Council
Page 115 and 116: essence, the Panel is recommending
Page 117 and 118: put under one purview. There are si
Page 119 and 120: eviews of behavior in some area, be
Page 121 and 122: A More Secure World? A Critique of
Page 123 and 124: Recognizing the crisis of confidenc
Page 125 and 126: creation of an international commis
Page 127 and 128: The US commitment to the global rul
Page 129 and 130: The closest the UN came to executin
Page 131 and 132: them, as the Panel readily acknowle
Page 133 and 134: Though the Panel offers very little
Page 135 and 136: the concept of collective security
Page 137 and 138: Assembly. Hopefully that input will
Page 139 and 140: generally also asserted that, despi
Page 141 and 142: shortcomings, as putting ever more
Page 143 and 144: powerful pairing of arguments that
Page 145 and 146: elsewhere and/or earlier. As discus
Page 147 and 148: for radical reform from the Secreta
Page 149 and 150: At San Francisco, the major powers
Page 151 and 152: over process. The prevailing view,
Page 153 and 154: significant power in its region. Th
Page 155 and 156: consequential proposals in other ar
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Indeed, if the Council is expanded
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egard—whether measured individual
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arriers to external intervention in
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Council, permanent or elected, have
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Security Council Expansion: Can’t
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importantly the quite proper concer
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superpowers in those situations whe
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Democratic majority (itself virtual
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developed countries known as the G-
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widely, an effective body might rea
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any US action. In much of the world
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Some Thoughts—Mostly Cautionary
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Panel Report goes further, however,
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• If the state fails in the midst
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the proactive rescue measures to th
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• There is a need for early and c
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HIV/AIDS could focus sustained glob
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THE SECURITY COUNCILEnlargement of
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model will depend, as at present, p
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Brief Notes on the Report of the Hi
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speech at Oxford in 1993. Ten years
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Negotiation difficulties, however,
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consensus but they embody little in
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NEGOTIATING CHARTER REFORMFor the a
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asic willingness to commit to a sys
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ecent Chapter VII resolutions have
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The Yale Center for the Study of Gl
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Reforming the United Nations for Peace and Security

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