- Page 1: Reformingthe United Nationsfor Peac
- Page 5: ContentsWorkshop ParticipantsvAckno
- Page 9: Michael ReismanMyres S. McDougal Pr
- Page 13 and 14: OverviewErnesto ZedilloDirector, Ya
- Page 15 and 16: The important decision to make Secu
- Page 17 and 18: member of the Panel’s Secretariat
- Page 19 and 20: the new permanent members with a cl
- Page 21 and 22: A model for a Security Council with
- Page 23 and 24: criteria are intended not just to l
- Page 25 and 26: TERRORISMThe Panel report urges the
- Page 27 and 28: Participants also questioned the va
- Page 29 and 30: FINAL CONSIDERATIONSThe High-level
- Page 31 and 32: Promoting Democracy through Interna
- Page 33 and 34: law—can channel internal dissent
- Page 35 and 36: Many others had differences with th
- Page 37 and 38: THE BEST KEPT SECRET: THE COMMUNITY
- Page 39 and 40: Unfortunately, the Seoul Conference
- Page 41 and 42: The important point is that the abi
- Page 43 and 44: government by the Group’s most po
- Page 45 and 46: Ministerial Meeting, the Convening
- Page 47 and 48: 2. Private foundations whose missio
- Page 49 and 50: APPENDIX TO “PROMOTING DEMOCRACY
- Page 51 and 52: The Report of the High-level Panel
- Page 53 and 54: threats”. 28 So vulnerable indeed
- Page 55 and 56: that the UN might be “facing a fo
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aw distributions of power and make
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Security Council. One of the Commis
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The second message of the report st
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vote of this member with veto power
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GOVERNANCE IN THE ECONOMIC DOMAINWh
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Comments on the Report of the High-
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ecommendations would also have the
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PANEL RECOMMENDATIONS ON ECONOMIC A
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What is worse is that almost an exc
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The conceptual underpinning of the
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such an eventuality; and to assist
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But it compromises on its own presc
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The UN represents the highest level
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The European Union in the United Na
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In the UN, the European Common Fore
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egard to resolutions put to a vote
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The European Commission cautiously
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The Group of Eastern European State
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“respect … for international la
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political declarations, especially
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marginalization. If the Security Co
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growth, the success of the democrat
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Comments on the Report of the High-
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• Regarding ECOSOC, the report ob
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cause of international peace and se
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• The Panel flatly rejects the ar
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In Model A, six of the nine new sea
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The Model A version of the new SC w
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Increased legitimacy helps Council
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essence, the Panel is recommending
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put under one purview. There are si
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eviews of behavior in some area, be
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A More Secure World? A Critique of
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Recognizing the crisis of confidenc
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creation of an international commis
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The US commitment to the global rul
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The closest the UN came to executin
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them, as the Panel readily acknowle
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Though the Panel offers very little
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the concept of collective security
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Assembly. Hopefully that input will
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generally also asserted that, despi
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shortcomings, as putting ever more
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powerful pairing of arguments that
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elsewhere and/or earlier. As discus
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for radical reform from the Secreta
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At San Francisco, the major powers
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over process. The prevailing view,
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significant power in its region. Th
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consequential proposals in other ar
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Indeed, if the Council is expanded
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egard—whether measured individual
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arriers to external intervention in
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Council, permanent or elected, have
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Security Council Expansion: Can’t
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importantly the quite proper concer
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superpowers in those situations whe
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Democratic majority (itself virtual
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developed countries known as the G-
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widely, an effective body might rea
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any US action. In much of the world
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Some Thoughts—Mostly Cautionary
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Panel Report goes further, however,
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• If the state fails in the midst
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the proactive rescue measures to th
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• There is a need for early and c
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HIV/AIDS could focus sustained glob
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THE SECURITY COUNCILEnlargement of
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model will depend, as at present, p
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Brief Notes on the Report of the Hi
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speech at Oxford in 1993. Ten years
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Negotiation difficulties, however,
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consensus but they embody little in
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NEGOTIATING CHARTER REFORMFor the a
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asic willingness to commit to a sys
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ecent Chapter VII resolutions have
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The Yale Center for the Study of Gl