Reforming the United Nations for Peace and Security

makes for less buy-in by important states and regions, which in turnreduces its effectiveness.Both Models A and B would significantly reduce the Council’s legitimacyproblem. As Table 1 shows, both models increase the share of worldpopulation represented as permanent or semi-permanent members towell over 50 percent, considerably above the current arrangement. ModelB does better. And by allowing for change and some degree of sharing ofrenewable seats over time among major contributors, Model B would doeven better on legitimacy grounds than is indicated by the figures in thetable. For example, Indonesia, the world’s largest Muslim country, mightperiodically serve in a four-year renewable seat.Table 1: Likely permanent/renewable members of Model A andModel B Security CouncilsCountryGDP(%)Population (%) UN dues(%)United States 32.7 4.6 22.0Japan 12.6 2.0 19.6Germany 6.2 1.3 9.8United Kingdom 4.9 0.9 5.6France 4.5 1.0 6.5China 4.0 20.4 1.5Italy 3.7 0.9 5.1Mexico 2.0 1.7 1.1India 1.6 16.7 0.3Brazil 1.4 2.9 2.2Russia 1.1 2.3 1.2South Africa 0.3 0.7 0.4Egypt 0.3 1.2 0.1P-5 total (percent of world) 47.2 29.2 36.8Model A total (percent of world) 69.6 54.0 69.2Model B total (percent of world) 75.3 56.6 75.4Note: Italicized countries are Model B only. Permanent five members (P-5) are shown in bold.100