Denmark - International Encyclopaedia of Laws

Table of ContentsB. Defining Variable and Fixed Costs 137C. ‘Meeting Competition’ Defence 138D. Tying and Bundling 139IV. Refusal to Deal 141V. Margin Squeeze 143VI. Selective Price Cuts 144VII. Other Forms of Abuse 145Chapter 3. Concentrations 146§1. INTRODUCTION 146I. The Rules 147II. Administration 148III. Fines 148§2. HORIZONTAL MERGERS 148I. Non-coordinated Effects 149A. Where the Merging Firms Have Large Market Shares 149B. Where the Merging Firms Are Close Competitors 150C. Where Customers Have Limited Opportunities for SwitchingSuppliers 151D. Where Competitors Are Unlikely to Increase Supply If PricesIncrease 151E. Where the Merged Entity Is Able to Stifle Expansion byCompetitors 152F. Where a Merger Eliminates an Important Competitive Force 153II. Coordinated Effects 153A. Reaching Terms of Coordination 154B. Monitoring Deviations 155C. Deterrent Mechanisms 156D. The Reactions of Outsiders 156III. Mergers with Potential Competitors 156IV. Mergers Creating or Strengthening Buyer Power in UpstreamMarkets 157V. Defences 157A. Countervailing Buyer Power 157B. Entry 158C. Efficiencies 159D. Failing Firm Defence 159§3. VERTICAL MERGERS 160I. Introduction 160II. Non-coordinated Effects: Foreclosure 161A. Input Foreclosure 161B. Customer Foreclosure 163III. Other Non-coordinated Effects 163A. Disclosure of Sensitive Information 163IV. Coordinated Effects 16410 – Denmark Competition Law – (February 2011)