98911, People v. Baez

granted discretion to remove defense counsel under certaincircumstances. Burnette v. Terrell, 232 Ill. 2d 522, 535 (2009) (“Theprinciple that a judge has the discretion to remove defense counsel*** is not in dispute.”). For example, removal may be necessarywhen counsel is intoxicated or when counsel’s performance is soinadequate that the defendant is not receiving the level of assistanceof counsel guaranteed by the sixth amendment. Burnette, 232 Ill. 2dat 534-35. This court will not disturb the trial court’s decision toremove counsel absent an abuse of discretion. See Burnette, 232 Ill.2d at 535. “ ‘An abuse of discretion will be found only where thecourt’s ruling is arbitrary, fanciful, unreasonable, or where noreasonable person would take the view adopted by the trial court.’ ”People v. Patrick, 233 Ill. 2d 62, 68 (2009), quoting People v. Hall,195 Ill. 2d 1, 20 (2000).In addition to the limitations on the right to counsel of choicenoted above, a trial court is granted “wide latitude in balancing theright to counsel of choice against the needs of fairness [citation] andagainst the demands of its calendar.” Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. at152. Thus, “[a] judge may also remove defense counsel when thedemands of the court’s calendar necessitate the trial be held whencurrent counsel is unavailable.” Burnette, 232 Ill. 2d at 534. In sum,as the appellate court has noted, defendant’s chosen counsel muststand “ready, willing, and able” to provide competent representation.See People v. Tucker, 382 Ill. App. 3d 916, 920 (2008). 5In this case, the court removed attorney Granich after learning thathe was not ready to provide representation to defendant. Accordingto Granich, his motion requested that the court appoint both himself5 We note that the right to counsel of choice does not extend to defendantswho require counsel to be appointed for them. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S.at 151; Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 624(1989). Defendant acknowledges this, but he argues that once an attorneyis appointed for an indigent defendant, the defendant has the same right tocontinue with that attorney as a defendant who hires an attorney. The Statedisputes this assertion, arguing that an indigent defendant has no right tocounsel of choice that would inhibit a court’s ability to remove appointedcounsel. Because we find that Granich’s removal was permissible under theprotections afforded to retained counsel, we need not resolve this dispute.-50-