Elections and Conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa 2013 - Woodrow ...

policy issues, and hold political actors accountable.However, this requires a professional andindependent media. The Government of Somalilandshould deregulate radio, allowing independentstations to emerge. Moreover, media supportinitiatives are needed to improve journalisticstandards, as journalists will often write anything theyare paid to write. 26 Media organization such as theSomaliland Journalists Association and other CSOsand INGOs can foster partnerships between localand international media and supporting training onmedia standards to reduce inaccurate, prejudiced, andimproper reporting.Strategic Objective 4: Address SecurityConcernsRecommendation 1: Train Riot PoliceActors: Government and International PartnersAction: The Somaliland Government should providestronger training to security forces in order to preventexcessive use of force and future clashes with civilians.Specifically, the government should consider enlistingthe support of international partners such as the UKfor these capacity building programs. Foreignpartners can help design police training and share bestpractices for conflict resolution, crowd control, andrules of engagement.Recommendation 2: Encourage GrassrootsDialogue between Puntland and SomalilandActors: Civil SocietyAction: CSOs, religious leaders, and clan leaders canuse Track II Diplomacy – also known as citizendiplomacy – to increase dialogue and cooperationbetween Somaliland and Puntland. Track IIDiplomacy involves informal exchange betweenmembers of the civil society, religious, or privatesectors. It should include CSOs, traditional leaders,women, youth groups, and others who are inpositions to discuss common governance and securityissues, encourage peaceful co-existence, and combatpolitical and clan-based mobilization. Theseinteractions may be a catalyst for dialogue betweenSomaliland and Puntland on border disputes andbasic security and economic cooperation.Track I dialogue between government officials issensitive because it invokes complicated questionsabout recognition and sovereignty. However, covertTrack I dialogue between Puntland and Somalilandcould still be beneficial in some areas, such asintelligence collaboration on al-Shabaab.Recommendation 3: Explore the Development ofSocial Programs for YouthActors: INGOs, CSOs, Somaliland GovernmentAction: Youth (under 35) are susceptible to appealsfrom clan and political leaders seeking to mobilizethem to violence for political purposes, as well asfrom extremist groups like al-Shabaab. The allure ofthese opportunities and the financial, social, or otherbenefits they sometimes offer becomes increasinglystronger as legitimate opportunities for employmentand education in society wane. Though youth inSomaliland have not been particularly drawn topolitical violence or extremism in the past, growingunemployment and frustration – in combination withthe youth bulge – are increasing these risks. AlthoughSomaliland cannot strengthen its long-term economyand job market overnight, it can explore vocationaland educational programs that deter youth fromviolence and extremism. Some options may includeapprenticeship programs, support and incentives forhigher education, greater access to financing forentrepreneurs, microfinance programs, or a strongernational investment in vocational/skills trainingopportunities. The Government of Somaliland, civilsociety groups, youth organizations, and internationalpartners should begin to explore these alternatives.26 Somaliland Journalists in discussion with authors,October 29, 2012.Elections and Conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa 2013: Somaliland, Côte d’Ivoire, and Kenya 19