Elections and Conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa 2013 - Woodrow ...

exports were used to finance the official war efforts.Moreover, Gbagbo and his supporters relied on atleast $38.5 million in profits from their stake in thecocoa industry to finance their own ‘private’ warefforts. At the same time, the parallel export taxduties imposed on cocoa transiting through FNcontrolledzones during the conflict purportedlyraised approximately $30 million for the FN.Ouattara’s arrival into power gives him access to thecash cow of the cocoa industry, which could besource of funding for future conflict.Land TenureThe fusion of traditional customary rules for landtenure with written colonial land laws has exacerbatedconflict. Colonial agriculture was based on a form oftutelage, whereby an allogène (foreigner) was requiredto find an autochtone (indigenous) host to sponsorhim. 34 A similar arrangement comprised the core ofHouphouët-Boigny’s policy, which was predicated onthe notion that the “land belongs to those who workit.” This policy spurred the internal migration of theBaulé (Houphouët-Boigny’s ethnic group) from thecenter and the Joula from the North to the West – aregion traditionally inhabited by the We and the Bétéindigenous people (Gbagbo’s ethnic group). Thesegroups were often portrayed as primitive andincapable of properly using the land. This massivepopulation movement prompted the ‘Ivorian miracle’and created an ethnically homogenous, Baulé landedbourgeoisie, which supported the PDCI (Houphouët-Boigny’s party).However, once the cocoa industry collapsed, manyyoung Bété who had migrated to the city returned totheir rural areas to see that “their old fathers are poorwhile the strangers are rich…The fathers have soldtheir land to strangers.” 35 Since then, various attemptsto codify land tenure have led to a confusing array ofland ownership and usage rights. While national andinternational observers seem to agree that the currentland laws are technically sound, many acknowledgethat their complexity renders implementation difficult– especially when customary and statutory land rightsare closely intertwined. Moreover, in some areas, thevast majority of the land is not registered (cadastré),making it difficult to arbitrate land disputes betweenpast and current owners. Intractable land disputes34 Everyone not born in a village is technically a ‘stranger,’even if coming from a village 20 km away who share thesame ethnicity, because rights to own or use the land aretypically shared among a small number of lineagesconsidered indigenous (autoctonous) to the village. MikeMcGovern, Making War in Côte d’Ivoire, 2011.35 Ibid.also arise between previous owners and peasants thathave been granted the right to use the land. Thesepeasants become targets of violent resentment,especially if perceived to be non-Ivoirians. 36IV. MITIGATING FACTORSHighly Centralized Political PartiesThe fragile balance of power between parties is a riskfactor. However, the centralization of political partypower means that if consensus is reached at thecenter, party leaders can usually manage tensions onthe ground more easily. Thus, the potential forpolitical parties to mitigate conflict depends on thewillingness of key personalities to promote andmaintain peaceful conduct during the electoral cycle.Legitimacy of the FANCIThe media and public have largely accepted theFANCI as the legitimate successor to the previousarmed forces. This legitimacy gives Ouattara’sgovernment the impetus to proceed with SSR anddesignate FANCI as the electoral security force in2015.Strong Civil Society and MediaCôte d’Ivoire’s civil society is vibrant with manyimpartial organizations. They are largely respecteddomestically and by the international community(which often finances them) and can help mitigateelectoral conflict through education.Moreover, the media regulatory bodies – the NationalPress Council (CNP) and the High Authority forAudiovisual Communication (HACA) – have madesignificant progress since the previous presidentialand legislative elections towards ensuring equal accessfor political parties and coalitions. One result is thatopposition and ruling party papers may publishwithout much harassment. Thus, all political actorsare able to express their views and political platformsto the population.Due to the penetration of mobile phones throughoutCôte d’Ivoire, social media and telecommunicationsemerged as tools to report and stem incidents ofelectoral violence in 2010. Websites such as Ushahidiand Wonzomai were utilized in 2010 and should bepromoted and used by authorities and the public in2015 to report electoral violence and preventincidents from turning into serious atrocities.36 Interview with diplomatic officials in Brussels andAbidjan, October and November 2012.Elections and Conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa 2013: Somaliland, Côte d’Ivoire, and Kenya 27