Elections and Conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa 2013 - Woodrow ...

More documents

Recommendations

Info

eturn to instability and violence in 2015 if the rootcauses of the conflict are not addressed.The responsibility for mitigating the underlying causesof conflict rests primarily with Ouattara. He must makethe bold and difficult choices to break with the ways ofthe past and facilitate a second Ivoirian miracle.However, regardless of the amount of good will fromhis part, the two other political actors (PDCI and FPI)also must participate in reconstruction. They mustabandon the destructive political competition of thepast.International actors likewise face a difficult conundrum.On the one hand, the heavy-handed involvement of theinternational community helped break the impasse in2010. On the other hand, by stepping in the middle ofa zero-sum game, the international community has lostits credibility as a neutral interlocutor. As the countryrecovers from the crisis, fatigue with Côte d’Ivoire andfiscal austerity in Europe and the United States suggestdecreasing international involvement. While it is truethat Côte d’Ivoire has the human and financialresources to proceed quickly towards recovery,destructive and myopic political dynamics risk draggingthe country away from a peaceful recovery. Newmechanisms for cooperation and engagement must bedevised for all national and international players inorder to address the root causes of the conflict andshare the benefits of recovery equally among allIvoirians.Elections and Conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa 2013: Somaliland, Côte d’Ivoire, and Kenya 31
CASE THREE – KENYAI. SITUATION ASSESSMENT1. History of Electoral ConflictKenya has witnessed some degree of violence in eachof its four elections since the transition to multipartydemocracy in 1991. Electoral violence in 1992 and1997 largely occurred in the pre-election phase of theelectoral cycle as a means to displace – and therebydisenfranchise – the opposition to ensure PresidentDaniel arap Moi’s reelection. Armed militia groups,backed by government officials, attacked people fromethnic groups associated with opposition parties. Theviolence largely occurred in Kenya African NationalUnion (KANU) stronghold areas, especially in theRift Valley and Coast Provinces. In 1992, more than1500 people were killed and 300,000 had their homesdestroyed. The “success” of pre-electoral violenceand the subsequent failure of the Government ofKenya (GOK) to bring perpetrators and their backersto justice institutionalized violence as a means ofsecuring political power in Kenya.Violence in 2002 was significantly less pronounced,partly because the main presidential contenders camefrom the same ethnic group, the Kikuyu. However, in2007, electoral violence erupted on an unprecedentedscale, particularly in the Rift Valley and certain areasof Nairobi. Unlike pre-election violence in previouselections, the 2007/08 electoral conflict largelyoccurred in the post-election phase after incumbentPresident Mwai Kibaki was declared the winner andhastily sworn in, despite massive electoralirregularities. High level officials supporting both ofthe top contenders mobilized youth militias to attackmembers of rival ethnic groups, resulting in the deathof 1500 people and displacement of 660,000.Although the International Criminal Court (ICC) hascharged four instigators of the violence, very fewindividuals have faced prosecution for theirinvolvement in the post-election violence (PEV),raising concerns that electoral conflict has becomefurther entrenched in Kenya. Moreover, the scale andpacing of changes to the security, political, andjudicial systems under the 2010 Constitution raise thepossibility that conflict could occur in the mediumterm,as the country transitions from the electoralperiod to daily governance.2. Profile of 2013 Electoral ConflictThe 2013 elections present new security concerns,including the role of ICC and the upcoming trials ofUhuru Kenyatta and William Ruto, a poorly definedand managed devolution process, and the changingrole of the Provincial Administration in securityprovision. Many of the socio-economic vulnerabilitiesthat contributed to electoral conflict in the pastremain relevant in 2013, including a youth bulge,diaspora influence, tension over land and resources,unemployment, and inequality.II. STAKEHOLDERS ANALYSIS1. State StakeholdersIndependent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC)The IEBC is Kenya’s electoral management body,replacing the Electoral Commission of Kenya (ECK),which was widely blamed for mismanaging the2007/08 election. Kenya’s 2010 Constitution and theIndependent Electoral and Boundaries CommissionAct (2011) laid out the framework for the IEBC’sroles and management. The IEBC is responsible forvoter registration, delimitation of constituencies andwards, regulation of political parties, settlement ofelectoral disputes, political party and candidateregistration, voter education, facilitation of electionobservation, monitoring and evaluation of elections,campaign finance regulation, development ofelectoral code of conduct for political parties andcandidates, and monitoring of candidate nominationwithin political parties. Despite poor publicperception of the previous ECK, the IEBC hasmaintained high public approval ratings since itsinception. 1 The public’s confidence in the IEBC’sability to effectively conduct the March 4th electionswill be vital to mitigating electoral violence on andimmediately after the elections. The IEBC will alsohave a role in long-term stability through its mandatein voter and civic education.Transition Authority (TA)The TA was established in 2012 as the primaryinstitution to implement the Transition to DevolvedGovernment Act. A chairperson and eight additionalmembers, appointed by the President (in consultationwith the Prime Minister) and approved by theNational Assembly, comprise the leadership.Members are selected from ministries of Finance,Public Service, Planning, Justice and the President’s1 “The Status of Governance in Kenya - a Baseline SurveyReport 2012,” The Society for International Development,Nairobi, Kenya, 2012. Elections and Conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa 2013: Somaliland, Côte d’Ivoire, and Kenya 32
Page 1: ELECTIONS ANDCONFLICT INSUB-SAHARAN
Page 4: The Somaliland team meets with civi
Page 8: EXECUTIVE SUMMARYElections play a c
Page 11 and 12: the challenges of a youth bulge, di
Page 13 and 14: CASE ONE - SOMALILANDI. SITUATION A
Page 15 and 16: political) role. However, in the po
Page 17: Weak Political Party SystemSince 20
Page 20: establish themselves, but are meeti
Page 23 and 24: per day the right to publicly campa
Page 25 and 26: electoral activities the assets of
Page 27 and 28: CASE TWO - CÔTE D’IVOIREI. SITUA
Page 29 and 30: Africa Network for Peacebuilding (W
Page 31 and 32: hinder the country’s recovery pro
Page 33 and 34: 3. Judicial VulnerabilitiesWeak jud
Page 35 and 36: V. RECOMMENDATIONSBefore attempting
Page 37: Political Considerations: Although
Page 41 and 42: eforms and manage instability/uncer
Page 43 and 44: administration. The new county gove
Page 45 and 46: General. Parties are prohibited fro
Page 47 and 48: that female candidates who contend
Page 49 and 50: loophole should be closed. The RPP
Page 51 and 52: Conclusion: Common Themes and Lesso
Page 53 and 54: level, as well as the promotion of
Page 55 and 56: Case Three - KenyaLazarus Kubasu -
Page 57 and 58: Somaliland Non State Actors Forum (
Page 59 and 60: IRIN News. “Côte d’Ivoire: Reb
Page 61 and 62: APPENDIX C: SOMALILAND MAP AND CLAN
Page 63 and 64: APPENDIX D: PROFILE OF 2012 ELECTOR
Page 65 and 66: with the law’s intention to ensur
Page 67 and 68: APPENDIX G: SOMALILAND RAC AND NEC
Page 69 and 70: Graph 1: Number of violent incident
Page 71: APPENDIX J: PROFILE OF 2010 ELECTOR

Elections and Conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa 2013 - Woodrow ...

Create successful ePaper yourself

Delete template?

Save as template?