Elections and Conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa 2013 - Woodrow ...

The United StatesThe United States is one of the primary funders ofthe UNOCI mission ($133 million in the fiscal year2010) and has provided election support through theCarter Center, the National Democratic Institute(NDI), and the National Endowment for Democracy(NED). These organizations have assisted in voterregistration efforts, deployment of long-termobservers, conflict resolution, and community-basedvoter education. While Côte d’Ivoire is not a strategicpriority for the United States, as opposed to Europe,American officials do have an interest in regionalsecurity developments.III. VULNERABILITIES1. Security VulnerabilitiesDemilitarization, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR)The 2007 Ouagadougou Peace Accords (OAP)demonstrated that security was a priority for allparties. DDR was supposed to address the largenumber of combatants involved in Côte d’Ivoire’sdecade-long conflict and prevent their involvement inthe electoral campaign. The DDR program aimed todemobilize the pro-Gbagbo and pro-Ouattaramilitias, including up to 23,777 members of the FN.Yet national and international estimates of thenumber of armed men demobilized vary greatly fromas a few a couple hundred to as many as 18,000. TheDDR program failed largely because of the mistrustbetween the two sides, with neither side feelingcomfortable relinquishing their weapons as long asthe other side remained armed. Few weapons wereactually collected, which enabled soldiers who heldonto weapons to enable a quick return to the militias.Another problem is that the DDR organizationalstructure itself hinders progress. Some observersblame the lack of political will as the main reason forthe poor design of the DDR process. Rather thanimplementing DDR as part of the National DDRProgram, the mandate was split between theIntegrated Command Center (CCI, co-led by FN andFDS representatives) and the National CivilianReinsertion Program (PNRC), which led tobureaucratic rivalries, delays, and policy divergence.Electoral violence erupted during the 2010 electionsbefore completion of the program, and subsequentprogress on DDR has stagnated. 12 Weapons and12 Reintegration has had poor results: 3,000 ex-combatantswere given jobs in labor-intensive sectors, such asconstruction and infrastructure maintenance. In the west,1,000 men were given training courses but failed to finddisgruntled combatants remain widespread in Côted’Ivoire and neighboring countries, creating asubstantial security risk.Security Sector Reform (SSR)SSR remains an intractable problem. The two maingroups involved in SSR are the FN and the pro-Gbagbo FDS, which was the standing army in theGbagbo era. Before the 2010 elections, the FN andFDS formed sizable armed contingents: the FN hadnearly 40,000 members while the FDS claimed nearly43,000. 13 Following the 2010 elections, Ouattaracreated by decree the Republican Forces of Côted’Ivoire (FRCI), later renamed Forces ArméesNationales de Côte d’Ivoire (FANCI). Many seniorFDS officers have since pledged their allegiance toOuattara and the new military institution, and manyformer FN combatants have been integrated into theFANCI. Nevertheless, several senior FDS leaders,who were once loyal to Gbagbo, have beenimprisoned on charges of electoral violence, while FNleaders have escaped prosecution. The FANCIremains a poorly trained force, and the forcedintegration of the FDS and FN has highlighted thestark differences in training and skills. Morale alsoremains low, particularly among former FDS troopswho feel that former FN members are givenpreferential treatment.Other Armed GroupsOther militia groups, particularly in the west, remainactive and present a security threat. They have notbeen demobilized or integrated into the army. Youthmilitias remain ready to act. The police and thegendarmerie are still highly politicized, and their rolesoften overlap with that of the FANCI, which createsconfusion. Dozos, a considerable force of traditionalhunters who supported Ouattara in 2010 andparticipated in electoral violence, also have not beeninvolved in SSR.2. Political VulnerabilitiesThe reintegration of the FPI in Ivoirian politicsCurrently, the FPI leader, Laurent Gbagbo, isawaiting trial in The Hague, while many seniorofficials are in exile or in prison. Leaderless andgeographically and ideologically split, the FPI maystable jobs. International Crisis Group, “Côte d’Ivoire:faire baisser la pression.”13 This total includes the 14,000 members of the armedforces, 16,000 gendarmes (rural police), and 13,000 police.Interview with diplomatic official in Brussels, October2012.Elections and Conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa 2013: Somaliland, Côte d’Ivoire, and Kenya 23