Wynehamer v People.pdf - The University of Texas at Austin

ALBANY, MARCH, 1856. 469Wynehamer against The People.in its uncertain paths, and involving ourselves in the graveabsurdity of holding that a statute which forbids a personselling an article of use and consumption, and renders it, necessary for him to keep it for his own use and consump'tion, instead of selling it to others to be used or consumedby them, really takes it away from him, and deprives himof it contrary to the constitution. It will be found impossiblefor this court, extensive and final as its authority is, tomake a proposition true in law which is so essentially andpalpably untrue in fact.But should we adopt the fallacy that the exchangeablevalue of the chattel is the legal property, and that this iswhat the constitution was designed to protect, how wouldthat affect the statute in this case ? There is nothing inthe terms of the act on the subject of value or price; andthe fact, if it be one, that its operation has been to reducethe price or market value of liquors, is the subject ofevidence, and must be established by proof. There is nota word of proof upon the subject in the case, one way orthe other. It is not a fact of which we can take judicialnotice; for the courts, without evidence, cannot see whetherthe tendency of the act has been or will be to enhance orto diminish the value of the stocks on hand when the acttook effect. Certainly it is no truism, either in law or inpolitical economy, that a restriction upon the sale of auarticle diminishes its exchangeable value under all circumstances.If it may be still sold for some purposes, theresult may well be to enhance the value. That woulddepend in a great degree upon the future supply. But forthis court to assume the fact that the act has had or thatit will have the effect to reduce or destroy the market pricesor value of the article as the basis of its action, without anyevidence whatever to support it, and proceed to declare thestatute void on that ground, would be a proceeding without precedent or parallel in judicial history. It would bea mere arbitrary judicial repeal of the statute, instead of aS KERN.—30