FIFTH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON THE EU TURKEY AND THE KURDS

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FIFTH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON THE EU, TURKEY AND THE KURDS In December 2006 the Hacettepe University’s Institute of Population Studies reported that the number of IDPs was substantially higher than previous estimates – in fact between 950,000 and 1,200,000 195 . The 2008 EU Commission Progress Report on Turkey stated, as it had in 2007, that Turkey lacked an ‘overall national strategy to address the situation of IDPs’. 196 It notes that there remain ‘shortcomings’ in the implementation of the Law on Compensation, particularly regarding the ‘uneven and inequitable calculation of compensation between provinces’ and the pace at which applications for compensation are processed. 197 The report also states that IDPs continue to suffer from suffer from ‘economic and social marginalisation’ 198 The Report underlines that the security situation, as well as a lack of basic infrastructure, lack of capital, and limited employment opportunities continue to prevent the return of many IDPs to their homes 199 . The threat posed by the village guard system is identified an additional problem, and it is noted that no progress has been made to abolish the village guard system 200 . The recent escalation of the conflict in the Kurdish region, particularly near the border with Iraq, seems likely to slow progress in the IDP situation in Turkey. The conflict has had a devastating effect on civilian lives and is unlikely to result in any concrete gains for Turkey. The Future: Achieving Full Compliance with the Copenhagen Criteria One key question for Europeans and reform-minded groups in Turkey is how they can help ensure that Turkey’s EU accession process has the biggest possible impact in terms of improving the human rights situation in Turkey. Mistakes could be made in one of two directions. Firstly, the EU might fail to make the best use it can of the unusual leverage it enjoys during negotiations by accepting Turkey even though it had not improved its human rights standards to the extent that it was able. This has been an implicit criticism levelled by those who claim that Turkey had not met the requisite Copenhagen Criteria standards for beginning negotiations, and by those who have claimed that the Commission’s Turkey Progress Reports have at times put a gloss on the true situations in Turkey. 195 EU Commission Turkey Progress Report 2007, p.23 196 European Commission 2008 Progress Report, 5 November 2008, SEC (2008) 2699, p. 28 197 European Commission 2008 Progress Report, 5 November 2008, SEC (2008) 2699 p. 28 198 European Commission 2008 Progress Report, 5 November 2008, SEC (2008) 2699 p.28 199 European Commission 2008 Progress Report, 5 November 2008, SEC (2008) 2699, p. 28 200 European Commission 2008 Progress Report, 5 November 2008, SEC (2008) 2699, p. 28 188
FIFTH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON THE EU, TURKEY AND THE KURDS Alternatively, an excessively rigorous application of human rights standards, or rhetoric from Europe that is too condemnatory or pessimistic about Turkey’s efforts might have the effect of demoralising reformers, alienating mildly pro-reformist constituencies in Turkey, and lending credence to those who claim that the EU is not really serious about letting Turkey join the Union. All of this could seriously undermine the prospects for lasting, deep reform in Turkey, and might even turn the country away from Europe and its values altogether. This danger is especially acute given the fact that, as mentioned previously, increasingly influential EU member states have been voicing reservations about Turkey ever enjoying full membership. In order to avoid falling into either of these traps it seems sensible that the EU concentrates on identifying and promoting a complete but finite set of legislative changes and judicial and administrative targets necessary for Turkey to put itself in compliance with the political and human rights components of the accession criteria, as identified by the Helsinki Criteria. It must be made clear that meeting these targets is both necessary for Turkey if it is to become an EU member, but also that it is as much as is strictly necessary within the field of human rights and institutional change. In other words, once these targets are met Turkey should understand that it must merely comply with the economic requirements of accession in order to become a member. Obviously, it is not within the scope of this report to identify such a complete set of targets. However, it does seem productive to highlight some of the key changes that need to be made in order for Turkey to progress speedily towards full compliance with the Helsinki Criteria. 1. It is vital that civilian control of the Turkish military be deepened and cemented. It is unthinkable to have a member state of the EU in which the military exercises the level of influence on politics that it does in Turkey. The military can currently operate with a wide degree of discretion because the Turkish Armed Forces Internal Service Law and the Law on the National Security Council, which determine the operational parameters of the military, define national security extremely loosely. 201 In order to achieve compliance with the Copenhagen Criteria it seems clear that these loose descriptions of the military’s responsibilities must be replaced with a restricted and unambiguous statement of its position, which confirms its subordinate position to the democratic civilian government and Turkish constitution. Additionally it is vital that civilian auditing of the military budget, which is currently unable to ensure full accountability due to caveats such as that excluding extremely important ‘extra-budgetary funds’, is freed from restrictions. 201 European Commission 2008 Progress Report, 5 November 2008, SEC (2008) 2699, p. 9 189
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FIFTH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON THE EU TURKEY AND THE KURDS

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