FIFTH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON THE EU TURKEY AND THE KURDS

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FIFTH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON THE EU, TURKEY AND THE KURDS said to be on the alleged hit list. Critics, however, accused the AK Party of simply taking revenge on its Kemalist opponents with all these charges. 32 Unfortunately, therefore, the AK Party has not succeeded in countering the hostile political atmosphere. ‘The dilemma the JDP [AK Party] faces is that it can only reform the system by solving the deeply rooted political tensions emanating from the undemocratic management of identity claims in Turkey without upsetting the status quo. This dilemma necessitates consensus-building between the JDP, the Republican People’s Party (CHP or RPP) and the secularist establishment, which is not happening.’ 33 The Kemalist establishment still considers demands for changes to its strict interpretation of secularism as a security threat. Although at first the cultural and identity dimensions of the Kurdish issue could be debated, for example, the AK Party has now been forced to shift back to an economic and security agenda à la the Ecevit days. Following its tremendous electoral victory in July 2007, the AK Party apparently committed an error by trying to amend Turkey’s secular constitution to allow the headscarf to be worn in universities. Not only did this attempt place Kurdish reforms on the back burner, but it also presented the Kemalist establishment the ammunition it needed to attack the AK Party as an Islamic threat to secularism. In short order, the AK Party was battling for its very life against the attempt by the Constitutional Court to ban it. Although Erdoğan’s party managed to survive this attempt at a ‘judicial coup’ by one lone vote in July 2008, the AK Party seemingly emerged from the ordeal significantly chastised. Many believe that it was at that point Erdoğan struck an informal compromise with the military to drop his reformist agenda in return for being allowed to remain in power. According to Yavuz Baydar, a columnist for the daily Today’s Zaman, the result is ‘a new, sort of confused, aimless AKP.’ 34 Thus, accession talks with the EU have drifted. Pre-existing Kemalist constitutionalism is replacing parliamentary sovereignty. Plans for writing a new constitution have been shelved. On top of this, the AK Party itself has shown problems with being publicly criticized and increasingly has been using the language of democracy only in rather selective ways. At the same time, the military has managed to recoup its political influence despite the EU harmonization laws that sought to limit it. New strategies such as press briefings on political developments in the country as well as activities intended to further popular support have been employed. 32 See, for example, Michael Rubin, “Erdoğan, Ergenekon, and the Struggle for Turkey,” Mideast Monitor, August 8, 2008, http://www.meforum.org/article/1968, accessed August 11, 2008. 33 Burhanettin Duran, “The Justice and Development Party’s ‘New Politics’: Steering Toward Conservative Democracy—A Revised Islamic Agenda or Management of New Crises?” in Unit Cizre, ed., Secular and Islamic Politics in Turkey: The Making of the Justice and Development Party (London: Routledge, 2008), p. 91. 34 Cited in Sabrina Tavernise, “Turkey’s Liberals Speaking Out as Reform Stalls,” New York Times, November 24, 2008. 68
FIFTH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON THE EU, TURKEY AND THE KURDS The AK Party’s retrenchment on the Kurdish issue was amply illustrated when Erdoğan journeyed to the southeast in the fall of 2008 to campaign for the local elections scheduled to be held in March 2009. As noted above, the AK Party had already shocked observers by slightly out polling the pro-Kurdish DTP in the southeast during the July 2007 elections. At that time the AK Party’s stress on improving economic conditions for the locals had seemingly resonated more with them than the DTP’s Kurdish nationalist stance. Thus, when Erdoğan arrived in the fall of 2008, the pro-Kurdish DTP reacted strongly against the attempt to seize what its mayor in Diyarbakır Osman Baydemir has called its ‘castle,’ by orchestrating the closure of shops, stone throwing, and running street battles. Erdoğan responded with a call to his Kurdish opponents to love Turkey or leave it. 35 Nothing more strikingly could contrast the newly security-oriented prime minister of 2008 with the one who had called for more democracy to solve the Kurdish problem in 2005. ‘These are not the words of a reformer,’ declared Yasemin Çongar, the deputy editor in chief of Taraf, a liberal newspaper. 36 Hasan Cemal, a columnist for the daily newspaper Milliyet, added: ‘Erdoğan changed the whole discourse. This is the kind of disillusionment we have been having.’ Cemal also confessed that he was now having doubts about ‘whether Erdoğan is still sincere about Turkey’s membership accession to E.U.’ At the same time another signal event of the AK Party’s new Turkish nationalist, security-oriented position occurred with the resignation of Dengir Mir Mehmet Fırat as the deputy chairman of the party. Firat had been known for being a relative of a former Kurdish rebel and more to the point his progressive opinions on the Kurdish issue, EU membership, and writing a new constitution. He had recently ruffled Kemalist feathers by joining some DTP leaders for lunch in Istanbul. Thus, his resignation announced on November 7, 2008 not only seemed forced, but also in protest against his party’s new hardened attitude toward the Kurds. He was replaced by former Interior Minister Abdülkadir Aksu who, although of Kurdish origins, has always had positive relations with the state security forces. 37 The annual EU Progress Reports on Turkey and US State Department Country Reports on Human Rights practices in Turkey offer detailed analyses of the evolving situation. 35 Cited in Emrullah Uslu, “Firat Resignation May Indicted a Hardening of AKP Kurdish Policy,” Vol. 5, No. 216 Eurasia Daily Monitor (Jamestown Foundation), November 11, 2008. 36 This and the following citations were taken from Tavernise, “Turkey’s Liberals Speaking Out as Reform Stallls.” 37 Lale Sariibrahimoglu, “Kurdish Issue Is Deadlocked Again,” Today’s Zaman November 14, 2008. 69
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FIFTH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON THE EU TURKEY AND THE KURDS

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