FIFTH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON THE EU TURKEY AND THE KURDS

More documents

Recommendations

Info

FIFTH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON THE EU, TURKEY AND THE KURDS The ongoing attempt to ban the DTP for allegedly ‘engaging in activities against the unity and integrity of the country’ (p. 6) also merited concern: The Report noted that the Chief Public Prosecutor had applied to the Constitutional Court requesting ‘that 221 former and present members of the party be banned from being member[s] of a political party for five years’ (Ibid.). This would preclude these DTP members from simply joining a new pro-Kurdish party as previously had occurred when the earlier one had been banned. The Report concluded that the closure cases against the AKP and the DTP . . . illustrate that the current legal provisions applicable to political parties do not provide political actors with an adequate level of protection from the state’s interference in their freedom of association and freedom of expression’ (p. 18). Regarding the new constitution for Turkey ‘aligning Turkey with international standards on fundamental rights’ (p. 6) and promised by the AK Party following its great electoral triumph in July 2007, ‘no draft has been presented either to the public or to parliament, and no clear timetable has been set for discussing it’ (Ibid.). Rather, the government spent its energies on trying to constitutionally lift ‘the headscarf ban for university students’ (Ibid.). Furthermore, ‘the armed forces have continued to exercise significant political influence via formal and informal mechanisms. Senior members of the armed forces have expressed their opinion on domestic and foreign policy issues going beyond their remit, including . . . the south-east’ (p. 9). The Report also added that ‘no progress has been made on strengthening parliamentary oversight of the military budget and expenditure’ (Ibid.). 40 In addition, the Şemdinli case was transferred to a military court and the accused released ‘pending trial’ (p. 10). The Şemdinli case involved a bombing in November 2005 that killed one person and injured others in this south-eastern town. This bombing was apparently carried out with covert military approval as a provocation against Kurdish nationalists and has now been covered up. 41 On a more positive note, the report mentioned that the Turkish government had announced an economic plan of development for the southeast in May 2008. This proposal would fund 14 billion Euros to complete the Southeast Anatolia Project (GAP). ‘The four pillars of the action plan are: economic development, social development, infrastructure development and institutional strengthening. Most investments will concentrate on the energy and agriculture sectors.’ (p. 27) 40 For a recent evaluation of the changing political role of the Turkish military, see Sule Toktas and Umit Kurt, “The Impact of EU Reform Process on Civil-Military Relations in Turkey,” SETA Policy Brief No. 26, November 2008, which points out that “Turkey has traditionally regarded its military as [a] strength in international organizations such as NATO. Yet in the EU accession process, the Turkish military has come to be considered a weakness.” Ibid., p. 2. The formal lessening of the role of the National Security Council has been the most visible concession Turkey’s military has made to the country’s EU candidacy. 41 For background details concerning the Semdinli case, see Michael M. Gunter, “Deep State: The Arcane Parallel State in Turkey,” Orient 47, 3 (2006), pp. 344-46. 72
FIFTH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON THE EU, TURKEY AND THE KURDS In conclusion, although ‘the government expressed its commitment to the EU accession process and to political reforms . . . despite its strong political mandate, the government did not put forward a consistent and comprehensive programme of political reforms.’ (p. 7) ‘Further efforts are needed in order to create the conditions for the predominantly Kurdish population to enjoy full rights and freedoms.’ (p. 28) A motion on behalf of the EU Parliament’s Committee on Foreign Affairs regarding the Report called ‘on the Turkish government to launch as a matter of priority a political initiative favouring a lasting settlement of the Kurdish issue, which initiative needs to address the economic and social opportunities of citizens of Kurdish origin’ 42 The Kurdish Human Rights Project (KHRP) in London, a major watchdog for Kurdish rights, concurred, arguing that the EU Progress Report ‘underlines the failure of the Turkish authorities to press ahead with earlier human rights reforms.’ 43 The KHRP added that is was also ‘disappointing’ that the Report had not addressed ‘the human rights impact of Turkish cross-border military operations in northern Iraq, and the impact of hydro-electric projects in south-eastern Turkey on local populations.’ Others were not so diplomatic. A report in Today’s Zaman, a newspaper usually sympathetic to the AK Party, concluded that ‘the European Union is simmering with anger and discontent about . . . Erdoğan’s performance since his last election victory in July 2007. . . . Erdoğan is about to lose his once-immense respect among EU officials.’ 44 According to this report, ‘many diplomats and other high-level bureaucrats in Brussels . . . think Erdoğan is leaning towards ‘old-style Ankara politics,’ where all the energy is focused on winning elections and smearing rival politicians, but not reforming the country.’ More specifically, ‘EU officials think that Erdoğan pushed all the wrong buttons in the wake of his enormous election victory by shelving the proposed constitutional reform and focusing on the specific issue of the headscarf ban at universities, committing a massive strategic mistake.’ One high-level EU source concluded that ‘Erdoğan has no strategy at all with what to do with the EU. The perception we have is that he has shelved all EU-related reform and, more seriously, many think that he could not care less about Turkey-EU relations.’ As for the Kurdish issue specifically, ‘Erdoğan’s latest remarks calling on ‘those who do not want to live in Turkey to leave’ have created waves of shock in the diplomatic center of Europe.’ On the other hand, Erdoğan’s supporters claim that his government’s inertia has more to do with the upcoming municipal elections scheduled to held in March 2009. ‘Once 42 Cited in European Parliament, “Motion for a Resolution . . . on Turkey’s Progress Report 2008,” (RE\748541EN.doc; PE414.936v01-00), November 21, 2008, p. 5/9. 43 KHRP Response to European Commission Turkey Progress Report. For the full KHRP response to the EU Progress Report, see http://khrp.org/component/option,com_docman/task,cat_view/gid,40/ Itemid,47/ 44 This and the following citations were taken from Selcuk Gultasli, “EU about to Lose Hope in Erdoğan,” Today’s Zaman, November 11, 2008. 73
Page 1:
FIFTH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON T
Page 6 and 7:
Acknowledgments The EUTCC would lik
Page 8 and 9:
Page 10 and 11:
Page 12 and 13:
Page 14 and 15:
Page 16 and 17:
Page 18 and 19:
Page 20 and 21:
Page 22 and 23: FIFTH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON T
Page 122 and 123:
Page 124 and 125:
Page 126 and 127:
Page 128 and 129:
Page 130 and 131:
Page 132 and 133:
Page 134 and 135:
Page 136 and 137:
Page 138 and 139:
Page 140 and 141:
Page 142 and 143:
Page 144 and 145:
Page 146 and 147:
Page 148 and 149:
Page 150 and 151:
Page 152 and 153:
Page 154 and 155:
Page 156 and 157:
Page 158 and 159:
Page 160 and 161:
Page 162 and 163:
Page 164 and 165:
Page 166 and 167:
Page 168 and 169:
Page 170 and 171:
Page 172 and 173:
Page 174 and 175:
Page 176 and 177:
Page 178 and 179:
Page 180 and 181:
Page 182 and 183:
Page 184 and 185:
Page 186 and 187:
Page 188 and 189:
Page 190 and 191:
Page 192 and 193:
Page 194 and 195:
Page 196 and 197:
Page 198 and 199:
Page 200 and 201:
Page 202 and 203:
Page 204:
show all

FIFTH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON THE EU TURKEY AND THE KURDS

Create successful ePaper yourself

Delete template?

Save as template?