indonesia
SR53_Indonesia_Dec2015
SR53_Indonesia_Dec2015
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identifies forestry and peat, energy and transport, agriculture, industry, and waste as primary<br />
sectors for emissions reductions. The action plan is also complemented by another presidential<br />
regulation (Law no. 71/2011) on the implementation of a national greenhouse gases inventory. The<br />
two plans, along with the NEP14, require renewable energy to play an important role in meeting<br />
the country’s energy demand in order to mitigate climate change. 27 It remains to be seen, however,<br />
whether these targets will be met and if the government will be able to overcome challenges to<br />
increasing the role of renewable energy in the energy mix. The targets set in the National Action<br />
Plan also inform Indonesia’s commitments for the Paris 2015 UN Climate Change Conference<br />
talks in December 2015. Beyond any commitments made for the Paris conference, Indonesia<br />
should signal a post-2020 emissions reduction target.<br />
Challenges to Achieving the Objectives of the National Energy Policy<br />
There are a number of policy and structural challenges to Indonesia achieving the objectives<br />
of its national energy policy. This section examines each of these challenges and assesses to what<br />
extent the current Jokowi government has taken action to address them.<br />
Subsidies<br />
In the late 1960s, when oil and gas production and exports were first ramping up in Indonesia,<br />
the government introduced subsidies on oil products in the transportation, industrial, and<br />
power-generation sectors in order to stimulate economic development. 28 However, since the<br />
country ceased to be a net exporter of oil in 2004, heightened demand for oil products and<br />
political pressure to maintain subsidies meant that government spending on subsidies steadily<br />
increased and became a significant burden on the state budget. The fuel subsidy was projected<br />
to balloon to 20% of the Indonesian state budget in 2014 because of anticipated movement in<br />
international market prices. Almost unanimously, experts on Indonesian energy policy identified<br />
the elimination of fuel subsidies as the top priority for the incoming Jokowi administration.<br />
Previous administrations had lacked either the political will or political capital to take on this<br />
important reform, and attempts to do so were often met with public protests and, in more extreme<br />
cases, rioting. 29<br />
In addition to fuel subsidies, Indonesia subsidizes electricity prices. In 2012, total spending on<br />
energy subsidies was equivalent to the central government’s combined capital and social spending<br />
and three times its infrastructure budget. Subsidies represent a huge opportunity cost and also<br />
disproportionately benefit high-income households. 30 By keeping the domestic prices of fuel<br />
(petrol, diesel, and kerosene) and electricity below their true market levels, government subsidies<br />
disrupt the normal mechanism for transmitting fluctuations in world oil prices and the rupiah’s<br />
exchange rate to the domestic market, thereby shifting risk to the government budget.<br />
In an attempt to address this issue, in November 2014 President Jokowi, less than a month after<br />
taking office, raised subsidized fuel prices by an average of 30%. This move was widely interpreted<br />
27 “Powering Up,” 30.<br />
28 Siew Hua Seah, “Can Indonesia’s Policy of Reconfiguring Its Energy Mix by Increasing Natural Gas Usage Support Its Initiatives to Reform<br />
Energy Subsidies?” Oxford Institute for Energy Studies (OIES), OIES Paper, November 2014, 1.<br />
29 Joe Cochrane, “Indonesia Struggles to End Fuel Subsidies,” New York Times, May 2, 2013.<br />
30 “Powering Up,” 17.<br />
INDONESIA’S ENERGY POLICY u STUART<br />
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