Terror

Recommendations

Info

Committee for Human Rights in North Korea Despite strong evidence of North Korea’s support for Syria’s chemical weapons program, no open-source evidence links this proliferation directly or indirectly to any Foreign <strong>Terror</strong>ist Organization. As noted in Section III.G above, FRAA Section 140 requires the U.S. State Department to report annually on states that harbor terrorists and that fail “to prevent the proliferation of and trafficking in weapons of mass destruction in and through the territory of the country.” Arguably, the U.S. State Department should be reporting on North Korea’s WMD proliferation because, by the U.S. State Department’s own admission, Pyongyang is harboring four Japanese Red Army hijackers. The U.S. State Department has historically reported on states’ proliferation-related activities, even without direct evidence that the governments in question were proliferating that technology to terrorists (supra Section II.E.7). Although the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction among state sponsors of terrorism does not fit the legal definitions of “international terrorism” or “terrorist activity,” the U.S. State Department has repeatedly cited military assistance to state sponsors of terrorism in its annual “Country Reports.” The U.S. State Department’s 2012 and 2013 reports also cite Iran’s provision of weapons, funds, and training to Syrian military forces since the beginning of the Syrian Civil War in 2011. As noted in Section II.E.7, the U.S. State Department has also cited defense and diplomatic cooperation with state sponsors of terrorism, including both Iran and Syria, to support its SSOT designations. Consequently, a recent Congressional Research Service report concludes that North Korea’s transfer of chemical weapons-related materials to Syria “conceivably could have met the criteria for re-listing as a state sponsor of terrorism.” 372 Although this is a more difficult conclusion to reach than it is for the conduct described in Section IV, there is sufficient precedent in U.S. State Department reports to support it. Section VI of this report addresses the question of whether WMD proliferation should be sanctionable under some other, more logically appropriate, authority. 372 Mark E. Manyin et al., “North Korea: Back on the State Sponsors of <strong>Terror</strong>ism Lists?,” CRS Report for Congress R43865 (21 January 2015), 14. 71
Joshua Stanton C. 2010, 2014: Direct Attacks Against South Korea 1. 2010: Sinking of the ROKS Cheonan On March 26, 2010, the South Korean naval corvette Cheonan exploded and sank, killing 46 sailors. On May 20, 2009, an international investigation group determined that a torpedo fired by a North Korean submarine sank the Cheonan. 373 Following the release of the report, members of Congress again began to call for North Korea to be re-listed as a SSOT; however, The Washington Post blog, The Cable, reported that the administration viewed the SSOT list as “overly politicized” and “more trouble than it’s worth.” 374 [Image Credit: Agencies, via China Daily 375 ] North Korea denied responsibility for the attack, accusing South Korea of orchestrating it to escalate tension. 376 373 The Joint Civilian-Military Investigation Group, “Investigation Result on the Sinking of ROKS ‘Cheonan’,” 20 May 2010 at http://news.bbc.co.uk/nol/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/20_05_10jigreport.pdf. 374 Josh Rogin, “The Cable: Zimbabwe ambassador heckles U.S. official; N. Korea on terror list?,” The Washington Post, 27 May 2010. 375 “South Korea mourns victims of sunken warship,” China Daily, 28 April 2010, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/ photo/2010-04/28/content_9782137.htm. 376 “‘Cheonan’ Case Is Product of US-S. Korea Conspiracy—Rodong Sinmun,” KCNA 28 March 2011. 72
Page 1 and 2:
H R N K Joshua Stanton Arsenal of T
Page 3 and 4:
Copyright © 2015 by the Committee
Page 5 and 6:
Nicholas Eberstadt Henry Wendt Chai
Page 7 and 8:
Acknowledgements I offer my sincere
Page 9 and 10:
Table of Contents I. Executive Summ
Page 11 and 12:
2. 2014: Suspected Cyberattack on S
Page 13 and 14:
Joshua Stanton This report recommen
Page 15 and 16:
Joshua Stanton greater difficulty o
Page 17 and 18:
Joshua Stanton a state’s conduct
Page 19 and 20:
Joshua Stanton abstain from doing a
Page 21 and 22:
Joshua Stanton criteria answers oth
Page 23 and 24:
Joshua Stanton State Department’s
Page 25 and 26:
Joshua Stanton 2. Terrorism by Stat
Page 27 and 28:
Joshua Stanton it is a foreign orga
Page 29 and 30:
Joshua Stanton U.S. State Departmen
Page 31 and 32: Joshua Stanton In 2000 93 and 2001,
Page 33 and 34: Joshua Stanton The RGB is also beli
Page 35 and 36: Joshua Stanton The Obama Administra
Page 37 and 38: Joshua Stanton F. Legal Consequence
Page 39 and 40: Joshua Stanton requires U.S. repres
Page 41 and 42: Joshua Stanton Although North Korea
Page 43 and 44: Joshua Stanton Korea will probably
Page 45 and 46: Joshua Stanton E. 1997-2004: Terror
Page 47 and 48: Joshua Stanton The U.S. State Depar
Page 49 and 50: Joshua Stanton 2007 (infra Section
Page 51 and 52: Joshua Stanton a key factor in the
Page 53 and 54: Joshua Stanton None of the U.S. Sta
Page 55 and 56: Joshua Stanton Korean defectors, an
Page 57 and 58: Joshua Stanton The reports of North
Page 59 and 60: Joshua Stanton By 2004, the U.S. St
Page 61 and 62: Joshua Stanton terminating the appl
Page 63 and 64: Joshua Stanton IV. Post-2008 Suppor
Page 65 and 66: Joshua Stanton 1. 2009: M/V ANL Aus
Page 67 and 68: Joshua Stanton As noted in Section
Page 69 and 70: Joshua Stanton and hoped that weapo
Page 71 and 72: Joshua Stanton return to North Kore
Page 73 and 74: Joshua Stanton In June of 2010, Maj
Page 75 and 76: Joshua Stanton 5. 2011: Attempted A
Page 77 and 78: Joshua Stanton with intent to endan
Page 79 and 80: Joshua Stanton testing for two coun
Page 81: Joshua Stanton In February 2013, Is
Page 85 and 86: Joshua Stanton was a war crime. 380
Page 87 and 88: Joshua Stanton whether these attack
Page 89 and 90: Joshua Stanton 37 degrees 57 minute
Page 91 and 92: Joshua Stanton Although the U.S. St
Page 93 and 94: Joshua Stanton Since February 2011,
Page 95 and 96: Joshua Stanton In a briefing before
Page 97 and 98: Joshua Stanton government asked the
Page 99 and 100: Joshua Stanton On the morning of Mo
Page 101 and 102: Joshua Stanton On December 17th, So
Page 103 and 104: Joshua Stanton The army of the DPRK
Page 105 and 106: Joshua Stanton this case, hackers a
Page 107 and 108: Joshua Stanton 1. Clarify the Defin
Page 109 and 110: Joshua Stanton 3. Report and Consid
Page 111 and 112: Joshua Stanton • calling for the
show all

Terror

Create successful ePaper yourself

Delete template?

Save as template?