The Conjugal Dictatorship

The Conjugal Dictatorship of Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos
The story is told in a 24-page memo, which Mijares submitted to the
House International Organizations subcommittee. In the memo, he freely
confesses his own dirty work for Marcos.
The memo details how Marcos won reelection in 1969 using some
of the same tactics that Richard Nixon picked up in 1972. Mijares describes
the Marcos campaign as “the dirtiest election ever held in the Philippines.”
Marcos used “goons, guns and gold,” his former confidant charges,
to win the 1969 election. The strategy was to create an atmosphere of
disturbance, which called for Marcos’ strong hand to control.
The Philippine President, according to the memo, “had military
personnel infiltrate the ranks of demonstrators to explode bombs in their
midst and to instigate the demonstrators into committing acts of violence.”
Philippine air force infiltrators allegedly lobbed “heavy explosives in
front of the (U.S.) consular offices,” and “armed forces psychological warfare
units’ conducted bombings on Manila’s water system, city hall and the
bathroom of the Constitutional Convention.” The violence was “later blamed
by Mr. Marcos on the Maoist People’s Army.”
The incidents that Marcos secretly encouraged, Mijares alleges,
had their innocent victims. When a bomb exploded inside a department
store, for example, “a family man who was buying a gift for a child observing
its birthday was blown to bits.” A conscience-stricken police sergeant later
confessed he had planted the bomb on superior orders, claims Mijares.
To improve his press notices, Marcos allowed “heavy borrowings
from the Philippine Bank,” according to the memo, so a toady could buy up
a “media empire.” Allegedly the pro-Marcos media even collected “part of
their salaries . . . from the President’s contingent fund.”
These tactics worked so well, charges Mijares, that the reelected
Marcos continued using them to take over dictatorial power. Under the
Philippine constitution, Marcos was limited to two terms, but he had no
intention of retiring.
He continued to whip up a crisis fever. He staged “a supposed
landing of combat weapons,” for example, “along the coast of Digoyo.”
Mijares claims the weapons were planted by “a special operations groups
of trusted military men,” but Marcos loudly blamed “a foreign power” and
“Maoist guerrillas.”
There was also a faked ambush, Mijares charges, involving a
Philippine official's car. By exploiting these incidents, Marcos had the
country psychologically ready for his proclamation of martial law on
September 21, 1972.
With a great show of benevolence, he proclaimed a so-called
“smiling martial law.” He quickly restored order and gave the citizenry respite
from turmoil. But he also closed down opposition newspapers and jailed
recalcitrant editors and rivals.
Marcos asked a Constitutional Convention to put a stamp of
legitimacy upon his dictatorship. But when the delegates showed a little
independence, the memo states, he “caused the arrest and detention in
military stockades of delegates” and “bribed floor leaders of the convention
with money and favors.”
To make doubly sure the convention gave Marcos the powers he
Primitivo Mijares Page 36