Understanding Iran’s Role in the Syrian Conflict

30 Understanding Iran’s Role in the Syrian Conflict
Hizbullah’s Objectives in Syria
There was consensus among Lebanese interlocutors that Hizbullah’s involvement in Lebanon’s
southern front should be understood as part of a broader effort – one that precedes the Syrian
war – to establish a more enduring presence in the Golan Heights (parts of which were occupied
by Israel in 1967 and annexed in 1981) and, in doing so, stretch Hizbullah’s front with Israel
across borders, ‘from Naqoura to the Golan’, as one analyst put it.30
These efforts involve deepening ties with Druze communities in regime-held areas of southern
Syria. Iran’s presumed support for this campaign was glimpsed in January 2015, when an Iranian
general was killed alongside a senior Hizbullah operative in an Israeli air strike near Quneitra.
In December 2015, Israel killed another senior Hizbullah operative, Samir Kuntar, a Lebanese
Druze, who had taken on responsibility for this effort.31
Hizbullah’s ambitions in southern Syria have two consequences. First, they represent an attempt
to alter the status quo, in which both Israel and Hizbullah are mutually deterred by the damage
that could be inflicted by the other in another war. Israeli officials have declared the Golan a ‘red
line’ and supported this with the aforementioned assassinations. Israel has largely welcomed
Russia’s role in Syria as inhibiting Iran and Hizbullah (as set out in Chapter III, ‘The View From
Moscow’). However, should Russian airpower support a broader offensive by the Syrian regime,
Iran and Hizbullah in the south, towards the Golan Heights, then Hizbullah may enjoy greater
protection from Israeli air strikes, as the Israeli air force would be more cautious of operating
in closer proximity to its Russian counterpart and of conducting strikes in proximity to Russian
advisers and forward air-controllers on the ground. Thus far, Russian support for southern
offensives has been relatively modest.32 However, its facilitation of success in the north may aid
the regime in expanding its control in the south, which would in turn create new opportunities
for Hizbullah, and provoke continued Israeli responses.
Second, a long-term Hizbullah presence in southern Syria is likely to have an impact on the
broader political process. Saudi Arabia, other Gulf States and Turkey have all hardened their
long-standing opposition to Hizbullah in recent years, and all are likely to take particular issue
with any settlement that permits Hizbullah to maintain not just supply lines through a posttransition
Syria but, more egregiously, a physical presence in an Arab state. Jordan, some of
whose officials even view Syrian regular forces in southern Syria as preferable to extremist
rebel factions, will be similarly concerned; it was alarmed by the seizure of Sheikh Maskin
near the border in January 2016 by Syrian, Iranian and Hizbullah forces.33 Most rebel groups
30. Nour Samaha, ‘Lebanon Awaits Hezbollah’s Response’, Al Jazeera, 19 January 2015.
31. Shimon Shapira, ‘Hizbullah’s Golan Heights Front Loses Its Leader’, Jerusalem Center for Public
Affairs, 20 December 2015, ,
accessed 22 July 2016.
32. Erika Solomon and John Reed, ‘Russia Helps Shift Balance against Rebels in Southern Syria’,
Financial Times, 7 January 2016.
33. Osama Al-Sharif, ‘Why the Fall of This Syrian City Raises Red Flags in Jordan’, Al-Monitor,
8 February 2016.