Understanding Iran’s Role in the Syrian Conflict

Aniseh Bassiri Tabrizi and Raffaello Pantucci 37
that Russia is more credible than the regime in terms of enforcing a deal. Other ceasefires were
agreed between the FSA and the Russians at around the same time, such as in Al-Qudsiyah on
the outskirts of Damascus, while rebel groups have expressed interest in similar truces agreed
under the auspices of Russia.28
Iran, too, is perceived as more credible than the government in Damascus. Tehran has brokered
several deals with various opposition forces, notably in Homs in May 2014.29 While the rebels
view Iran as the key supporter of the regime, they are often prepared to engage with it,
whether through ceasefires or discreet meetings. Opposition sources say that meetings with
Iranian officials, including with Islamist groups, have taken place in Beirut and Tehran. Iran has
also struck key deals with Islamist forces on behalf of the Assad regime, notably the October
2015 truce in southern and northern Syria between the regime and Hizbullah on the one hand
and Jaish Al-Fateh (a coalition of Islamist and jihadist forces, including Al-Nusra and the ultraconservative
Ahrar Al-Sham) on the other. The deal, which covered fourteen towns, including
the areas of Zabadani, Foua and Kefraya, involved a ‘population swap’ that moved civilians as
well as fighters to territory managed by their own sects in exchange for a local ceasefire.30 This
was initially condemned by Jaish Al-Fateh but, by December 2015, there had been transfers
of several hundred people.31 Such a decision – an apparent reversal of views by Jaish Al-Fateh
– might stem from fading hopes for a military resolution to the conflict, and a move towards
redrawing the map of Syria along sectarian lines.32
The deals that Iran has struck with various groups demonstrate a pragmatic engagement.
Politically, different opposition factions – possibly including the Muslim Brotherhood, Ahrar
Al-Sham and the FSA33 – have indicated publicly or privately that, when the dust settles in Syria,
partnership with Russia and Iran is possible. Even Al-Nusra, according to a senior member of
the group, does not intend to engage in open confrontation with Tehran, a position that reflects
Al-Qa’ida’s longstanding strategy of refraining from operations against Iran.34
The Kurdish View of Tehran’s Role in the Syrian Conflict
Outside the general rebel consensus stand the Syrian Kurdish political parties, mostly based in
north and northeast Syria in an area commonly known as Rojava, under the general administration
of the Movement for a Democratic Society (TEV-DEM). The largest Kurdish political party, the
28. Bassam Barabandi and Hassan Hassan, ‘Ceasefires In Syria’, Foreign Affairs, 25 January 2016.
29. Maria Abi-Habib, ‘Syrian Government, Rebels Agree to Cease Fire in Homs’, Wall Street Journal,
2 May 2014.
30. Aron Lund, ‘The Syrian Jihad: An Interview With Charles Lister’, Carnegie Endowment
for International Peace, 24 November 2015, , accessed 22 July 2016.
31. Nour Samaha, ‘Besieged Syria Rebels Evacuated In Rare Deal’, Al Jazeera, 28 December 2015.
32. Joshua Landis, ‘Population Transfers: The Wrong Path to Peace’, Syria Justice and Accountability
Centre, 26 August 2015, ,
accessed 22 July 2016.
33. Author conversations with political and military opposition individuals.
34. Interview over social media with representatives of the main rebel forces.