Understanding Iran’s Role in the Syrian Conflict

Aniseh Bassiri Tabrizi and Raffaello Pantucci 35
on a merger with Al-Nusra,12 but these fell through because Al-Nusra would not cut ties with
Al-Qa’ida.13 Since 2013, Islamist groups – mostly driven by their regional backers – have made
frequent attempts to push Al-Nusra away from Al-Qa’ida.
Given the extent of Iranian involvement in Syria, it seems that all groups are engaged in fighting
Iranian troops in some form, be it Quds special forces or Iranian-backed militias. Iranian-backed
Hizbullah and Iraqi militias have also spearheaded much of the fighting in northern and southern
Syria.14 A recent video produced by Al-Nusra purportedly shows Iranian special forces retreating
from Al-Eis in southern Aleppo.15 As fighting in Aleppo intensified in February and July, various
rebel forces clashed with pro-government forces, which included Iranian operatives and Iranianbacked
foreign militias.16
How Rebel Groups View Iran’s Policy in Syria
Despite the difficulty opposition groups have had in reaching agreement on a number of issues
in relation to the Syrian civil war, there are few differences in views on Iran’s presence in
Syria. While FSA factions that include military defectors from the Syrian army tend to be more
accepting of a long-term engagement with Iran, most rebel groups see Iran as a strategic and
sectarian enemy. While the possibility that any group will ultimately engage with Iran cannot be
ruled out, Iran’s involvement in the peace process is currently rejected by all opposition forces.
Iran presents two main threats to opposition groups. First, its direct military support of the Assad
regime, aimed at preserving his presidency, directly counters the objectives of rebel groups,
which all seek to replace the regime in some way. Iran’s involvement in battlefield successes not
only weakens opposition groups, but gives Assad a stronger position from which to negotiate at
peace talks. Second, Iran’s involvement in Syria is perceived by rebel groups as part of its support
for Shia across the region and an attempt to spread Shia influence. For example, Ahrar Al-Sham
has pushed the sectarian rhetoric that Iran’s involvement in Syria is part of a regional ‘Shia
sickle’.17 The group has demanded ‘the complete cleansing of the Russian-Iranian occupation
of Syrian land, and the sectarian militias which support it’,18 and with 40 other Islamist groups,
called for co-operation to counter the ‘Russian-Iranian alliance occupying Syria’.19
12. Mariam Karouny, ‘Al-Qaeda in Syria Tried to Merge With a Major Rival Faction – But it Completely
Backfired’, Business Insider UK, 31 January 2016, ,
accessed 22 July 2016.
13. On 28 July 2016, the group announced its split from Al-Qa’ida and its new name, Jabhat Fateh Al-
Sham. This might have an impact on a potential merger with Ahrar Al-Sham or other rebel groups.
14. Hassan Hassan, ‘Could the Iran Deal Lead to a Syria Deal?’, Foreign Policy, 15 July 2015.
15. Maayan Groisman, ‘Iran’s Special Forces Reportedly Suffering Heavy Losses in Syria’, Jerusalem
Post, 13 March 2016, ,
accessed 22 July 2016.
16. Sune Engel Rasmussen and Zahra Nader, ‘Iran Covertly Recruits Afghan Shias to Fight in Syria’,
The Guardian, 30 June 2016.
17. Ahmed, ‘Ahrar Al-Sham’s Apocalyptic Vision for Syria and Beyond’.
18. Lund, ‘Riyadh, Rumeilan, and Damascus’.
19. Sylvia Westall, ‘Syrian Rebels Call for Regional Alliance Against Russia and Iran’, Reuters,
5 October 2015.