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Feeling the PRD pulse<br />

Special Report: Shop Talk – China, ASEAN and robotics<br />

Our respondents see diverse productivity growth. Wage increases can be justified<br />

and, more importantly, absorbed by productivity growth. In the absence of reliable<br />

official numbers, we gauge labour productivity growth by asking our respondents<br />

whether their per-worker output has increased more than wages (Figure 6). 62% of<br />

respondents agreed with this statement, down from 67% last year. A material and<br />

growing minority said productivity growth lagged wage growth. This reflects the<br />

companies’ varying abilities in boosting productivity to absorb rising wage costs (see<br />

‘Asian manufacturers – A deep dive’ for more details). On average, however,<br />

productivity growth remains adequate to limit the spillover of wage costs to prices of<br />

final goods.<br />

An ageing workforce is a small<br />

short-term blessing and a big longterm<br />

challenge<br />

A shrinking labour force poses long-term challenges<br />

China’s labour shortage persists because of shrinking supply rather than strong<br />

demand. The working-age population has been declining since 2012 and is likely to<br />

keep falling in the coming decades, even with the recent relaxation of the one-child<br />

policy (Figure 7). Various socioeconomic factors remain disincentives to having<br />

multiple children, including the soaring financial and opportunity costs of raising<br />

children, women’s growing role in the workforce and changing social expectations.<br />

While having less excess supply of labour helps during a downturn, longer-term<br />

challenges stemming from an ageing population loom. First, having fewer workers<br />

Figure 5: Workforce utilisation level<br />

% of respondents, this and previous surveys<br />

Figure 6: Has per-worker output risen more than wages?<br />

% of respondents, this and past surveys<br />

100%<br />

90%<br />

80%<br />

Yes, a lot<br />

Yes, a bit<br />

2016<br />

2015<br />

2014<br />

70%<br />

60%<br />

2016<br />

2015<br />

2014<br />

No<br />

0% 10% 20% 30% 40%<br />

Source: Standard Chartered Research<br />

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60%<br />

Source: Standard Chartered Research<br />

Figure 7: Following Japan’s demographic footsteps<br />

Working-age population (aged 15-64), mn persons<br />

1,200<br />

UN projection<br />

1,000<br />

China<br />

800<br />

600<br />

400<br />

Japan (RHS)<br />

200<br />

0<br />

1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050<br />

Source: UN, Standard Chartered Research<br />

250<br />

200<br />

150<br />

100<br />

50<br />

0<br />

Figure 8: Old-age dependency has a long way to climb<br />

Population aged 0-14 and 65+ per 100 population 15-64, ratio<br />

100<br />

90<br />

80<br />

70<br />

60<br />

50<br />

40<br />

30<br />

Source: UN, Standard Chartered Research<br />

Total<br />

dependency<br />

ratio<br />

Old-age<br />

dependency<br />

ratio<br />

20<br />

Child<br />

10<br />

dependency<br />

ratio<br />

0<br />

1950 1965 1980 1995 2010 2025 2040 2055 2070 2085 2100<br />

19 July 2016 10

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