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Feeling the PRD pulse<br />
Special Report: Shop Talk – China, ASEAN and robotics<br />
Our respondents see diverse productivity growth. Wage increases can be justified<br />
and, more importantly, absorbed by productivity growth. In the absence of reliable<br />
official numbers, we gauge labour productivity growth by asking our respondents<br />
whether their per-worker output has increased more than wages (Figure 6). 62% of<br />
respondents agreed with this statement, down from 67% last year. A material and<br />
growing minority said productivity growth lagged wage growth. This reflects the<br />
companies’ varying abilities in boosting productivity to absorb rising wage costs (see<br />
‘Asian manufacturers – A deep dive’ for more details). On average, however,<br />
productivity growth remains adequate to limit the spillover of wage costs to prices of<br />
final goods.<br />
An ageing workforce is a small<br />
short-term blessing and a big longterm<br />
challenge<br />
A shrinking labour force poses long-term challenges<br />
China’s labour shortage persists because of shrinking supply rather than strong<br />
demand. The working-age population has been declining since 2012 and is likely to<br />
keep falling in the coming decades, even with the recent relaxation of the one-child<br />
policy (Figure 7). Various socioeconomic factors remain disincentives to having<br />
multiple children, including the soaring financial and opportunity costs of raising<br />
children, women’s growing role in the workforce and changing social expectations.<br />
While having less excess supply of labour helps during a downturn, longer-term<br />
challenges stemming from an ageing population loom. First, having fewer workers<br />
Figure 5: Workforce utilisation level<br />
% of respondents, this and previous surveys<br />
Figure 6: Has per-worker output risen more than wages?<br />
% of respondents, this and past surveys<br />
100%<br />
90%<br />
80%<br />
Yes, a lot<br />
Yes, a bit<br />
2016<br />
2015<br />
2014<br />
70%<br />
60%<br />
2016<br />
2015<br />
2014<br />
No<br />
0% 10% 20% 30% 40%<br />
Source: Standard Chartered Research<br />
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60%<br />
Source: Standard Chartered Research<br />
Figure 7: Following Japan’s demographic footsteps<br />
Working-age population (aged 15-64), mn persons<br />
1,200<br />
UN projection<br />
1,000<br />
China<br />
800<br />
600<br />
400<br />
Japan (RHS)<br />
200<br />
0<br />
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050<br />
Source: UN, Standard Chartered Research<br />
250<br />
200<br />
150<br />
100<br />
50<br />
0<br />
Figure 8: Old-age dependency has a long way to climb<br />
Population aged 0-14 and 65+ per 100 population 15-64, ratio<br />
100<br />
90<br />
80<br />
70<br />
60<br />
50<br />
40<br />
30<br />
Source: UN, Standard Chartered Research<br />
Total<br />
dependency<br />
ratio<br />
Old-age<br />
dependency<br />
ratio<br />
20<br />
Child<br />
10<br />
dependency<br />
ratio<br />
0<br />
1950 1965 1980 1995 2010 2025 2040 2055 2070 2085 2100<br />
19 July 2016 10