POLITICS GOVERNANCE STATE-SOCIETY RELATIONS

POLITICS, GOVERNANCE, AND STATE-SOCIETY RELATIONS
like those that suffused Tunisia and Egypt. Yet,
sensitivity to public opinion is not the same
as public accountability. Indeed, autocratic
governments have an unfortunate tendency
to cultivate positive public opinion without
accountability through methods—magnifying
threats, taking on foreign adventures, enacting
populist economic policies, and other steps—
that are likely to destabilize a struggling nation
in a disordered region. The legacy of such
tactics is deep cynicism about government
information and behavior, and a lack of trust in
government proposals. Securing public support
in a manner that stabilizes states and the region
will require governments to persuade the public
to overcome the skepticism and fear resulting
from the past four years of instability and invest
their governments with meaningful authority to
implement far-reaching changes. While we will
discuss rebuilding social trust below, we can say
here that citizens will be unlikely to trust without
a sense that they can correct their government’s
direction if they do not like it, or even reject it
entirely should circumstances warrant.
Even a superficial analysis suggests that liberal
democracy—that is, representative government
anchored in pluralism, individual rights, and legal
equality—is far more likely than any other regime
type to exhibit the above characteristics of
sustainable governance in a meaningful and reliable
manner. And, indeed, the hunger for democratic
self-government in the Middle East endures today,
despite all the developments since December
2010 that make democracy seem both harder and
farther away than ever. 3 The more that Arab states
3 For example, 80 percent of the populations in Arab countries
overall would prefer to live in a democratic country, according
to Mark Tessler, “Mapping (and Explaining) Attitudes toward
Political Islam among Ordinary Citizens in the Middle East and
North Africa: Selected Findings from the Arab Barometer,”
Arab Democracy Barometer (Fall 2014) http://www.
arabbarometer.org/sites/default/files/Mark%20Tessler%20
USIP%20Presentation.pdf.
move toward political systems that enshrine the
principles, practices, procedures, and protections
of democratic self-government, the more stable
and successful they will be over time.
The years since 2011 also make clear to all what
scholars of political transition already knew—the
path to democratic government is neither swift
nor linear. Faced with such daunting challenges
and violent disorder, readers of this report might
find a prescription for democratic government
Pollyannaish or perhaps wholly unrealistic. I have
no doubts about the necessity of the four qualities
outlined above for Arab governance to move from
disorder to stability. But given the length and
uncertainty of the path toward democracy, this
paper will offer some priority areas of focus for
internal and external efforts, priorities that will help
structure the ongoing efforts within Arab societies
to move toward effective, transparent, accountable,
and inclusive government by making their own
compromises and avoiding the pitfalls of the past.
As an initial matter, though, we must understand
how and why the region got to its current state,
to see how that breakdown shapes the conditions
under which a stable regional order can re-emerge.
Even those states of the Middle East that have not
experienced uprisings, violence, or state collapse
since 2011 remain beset by governance challenges
and are vulnerable to internal and external shocks
that could produce further instability. Equally
important, we must understand the roots of the
regional disorder to realize what kinds of seeming
solutions will not, in fact, deliver lasting peace and
stability. And so, with a clear eye on the horizon, we
must mark a path that leads us immediately ahead
between the Scylla of violent extremism and the
Charybdis of coercive authoritarianism.
10 ATLANTIC COUNCIL