DOWNSTREAM OIL THEFT

Downstream Oil Theft: Global Modalities, Trends, and Remedies
Mitigation
Mitigation efforts in Nigeria have historically been
equivocal at best, but the Buhari government
has undertaken the strongest measures to curb
hydrocarbons crime that the country has yet seen. In
the wake of the disastrous free-for-all of the Goodluck
Jonathan years and the decline in global oil prices that
began in 2014, there was little choice.
Buhari’s efforts at mitigation could be described as
both operational and strategic. On the operational level,
his replacement of top military commanders and naval
crackdown on Niger Delta oil trafficking have changed
the criminal landscape and seascape. According to one
maritime security source, the case of the M/T Maximus
revealed an agility and decisiveness few international
observers had expected from the Nigerian Navy, and
new naval bases charged with interdiction efforts
have indicated the resolve behind the rhetoric. In
a more aggressive legal move that took on industry
players, the government began requiring “letters of
comfort” from vessel owners stating that their ships
would not be involved in hydrocarbons trafficking. As
the letters would position the government to charge
the owners with fraud should the mere incidence of
oil theft be proven, there was considerable pushback
from shippers. While some of them may have been
seeking to avoid a check on their illicit activities, others
demurred out of a sense of distrust, fearing, perhaps
legitimately, that their ships could be caught up in illicit
activity without their knowledge.
One effort at domestic mitigation misfired in spring of
2016, when Solomon Arase, Nigeria’s inspector-general
of police, outlawed the sale or purchase of petrol or
diesel in jerry cans. Though the new policy was partly
intended to reduce trafficking in black-market fuel,
mainly by opportunists who buy fuel at retail outlets
and sell it at inflated prices where shortages have
occurred, it sparked considerable criticism, as so
many Nigerians rely on petrol or diesel generators to
make up for erratic supply from the national power
grid. 123 Within days, Arase had to soften the directive,
announcing: “Those with genuine intention to use
the products for their legal and genuine business are
allowed to purchase the products in Jerry cans.” 124 This
effectively negated the policy.
123 “Nigeria’s Ban on Jerry Cans for Fuel Will Leave Millions in
the Dark,” Quartz Africa, April 27, 2016, http://qz.com/671274/
nigerias-ban-on-jerry-cans-for-fuel-will-leave-millions-in-thedark/.
124 “Police Clarifies Statement on Sale of Fuel in Jerrycans,” TV360
Nigeria, April 29, 2016, http://www.tv360nigeria.com/policeclarifies-statement-sale-fuel-jerrycans/.
However, any meaningful effort at mitigating
hydrocarbons crime has to involve checks on the
political class who profit most from it. In this sense,
Buhari’s strategic moves have all been in the direction
of transparency: adoption of the Open Contracting
Data Standard, commitment to the 2016 Standard
of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative
(EITI), and a central registry of foreign entities
involved in Nigerian industries and real estate. 125 The
NNPC’s governance has been reformed. High-profile
prosecutions for corruption have gone forward, but,
in July 2016, Buhari complained that elements in the
judiciary were undermining the cases and called for
change. 126 Such obstructionism is only one indicator of
the deeply entrenched interests seeking to preserve a
profitably corrupt status quo.
Given the corrosion hydrocarbons crime in all its forms
has inflicted on Nigeria, the Buhari government’s
efforts can, at best, hope for modest progress in the
near term. Worse, some efforts at curbing oil theft
have given rise to other criminal enterprises. One such
entity, the Niger Delta Avengers, poses a grave threat
to national security.
The Niger Delta Avengers
In 2011, President Goodluck Jonathan awarded a
lucrative maritime security contract to a militiaturned-security-firm
run by Government Ekpomupolo,
known as “Tompolo,” commander of MEND before
the 2009 amnesty for Niger Delta militants, and a
relation of Jonathan. The arrangement proved to be
one case among many in Nigeria where the fox was
invited to guard the henhouse; the firm, Global West
Vessel Specialists Nigeria Ltd., was widely regarded as
deeply involved in oil theft. During Jonathan’s tenure,
money and patronage of this sort flowed toward the
president’s home territory of the Niger Delta. 127 But
when the Buhari government took power in 2015, it not
only committed to phasing out the amnesty but also
revoked Global West’s security contract and indicted
Tompolo on forty counts of fraud, to the tune of $171
million. On January 14, 2016, Tompolo failed to turn up
at court, and a warrant was issued for his arrest. He has
since been in hiding. 128
125 “Buhari Announces New Measures to Stop Corruption,”
This Day, May 13, 2016, http://www.thisdaylive.com/index.
php/2016/05/13/buhari-announces-new-measures-to-stopcorruption-2/.
126 “Nigeria: Buhari—Corruption Cases Being Scuttled,” all Africa,
July 19, 2016, http://allafrica.com/stories/201607190124.html.
127 Andrew McGregor, “Back to the Creeks: A Profile of Niger
Delta Militant Government Ekpomupolo, aka ‘Tompolo,”
Aberfoyle International Security, May 30, 2016, http://www.
aberfoylesecurity.com/?tag=niger-delta-avengers.
128 “Who Is Tompolo, the Niger Delta Kingpin Wanted for
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