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2<br />
Monday, july <strong>10</strong>, 2017<br />
DT<br />
Analysis<br />
Insight<br />
3<br />
Monday, july <strong>10</strong>, 2017<br />
DT<br />
The truth behind Qatar-Saudi crisis<br />
• Tribune Desk<br />
During the nearly four decades of<br />
life of their bloc, the Arab states of<br />
the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)<br />
have failed to attain their ideal of<br />
political consistency and strategic<br />
unity just like their pattern the European<br />
Union.<br />
Such a failure to achieve goal is<br />
apparently observable as the members’<br />
strategic interests conflict and<br />
their political spats show face every<br />
now and then. Their struggle for<br />
seizing leadership of the bloc remains<br />
standing and their national<br />
economies, which are supposed to<br />
be interwoven as a key feature of an<br />
economic union, remain parted.<br />
In the past few years, the deepest<br />
political gap of the six-nation<br />
Arab bloc was caused by differences<br />
between Saudi Arabia and Qatar.<br />
It overshadowed the Arab council’s<br />
all-out potentials, including its political<br />
clout in the regional equations.<br />
The division, additionally, has led to<br />
a polarised GCC, with some member<br />
states such as Bahrain and the UAE<br />
fully supporting Riyadh’s approach<br />
and others like Oman and Kuwait<br />
standing by Qatar that comes against<br />
the unilateral and overbearing policy<br />
of Saudi Arabia.<br />
In past few days, the tensions<br />
set for new escalation as on June<br />
5, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and the<br />
UAE, along with other countries out<br />
of the bloc, severed diplomatic ties<br />
with Doha by recalling ambassadors<br />
and expelling Qatar’s, and also<br />
suspend air, sea and land transport<br />
with Qatar.<br />
The fresh diplomatic spat called<br />
attention of the political analysts,<br />
pushing them to think that Doha is<br />
now on the course to wholly separate<br />
ways from Riyadh.<br />
What are the drives of the new<br />
crisis inside the GCC?<br />
Doha–Riyadh ideological conflict<br />
Although Saudi Arabia and Qatar<br />
are Sunni states they have different<br />
approaches to the sect. In fact,<br />
each one of them wants to apply<br />
and instill across the Muslim and<br />
Arab nations its own interpretation<br />
of the Islamic branch. The Saudi<br />
leadership propagates the Wahhabi<br />
ideology, which develops a narrow-viewed<br />
version of the Islamic<br />
life style. For example, it separates<br />
men and women in public places<br />
and also implements strict sharia<br />
law, allowing tough judicial rulings.<br />
It furthermore, does not recognise<br />
real rights for other sects of Islam.<br />
On the opposite side, Qatar stands<br />
and supports the Muslim Brotherhood<br />
that spreads almost across the<br />
Arab <strong>world</strong>, has a broader view of<br />
the religion, seeks more presence<br />
for the women on the public stage,<br />
and shows more respect for the other<br />
sects of Islam like Shia.<br />
Qatar-Saudi territorial disputes<br />
The rifts over territories between<br />
the two members of the Arab<br />
council have a historical record. In<br />
1992, Doha and Riyadh engaged in<br />
armed border clashes. The kingdom<br />
claimed ownership of 23 miles<br />
of the Qatari south-eastern coasts.<br />
The two neighbours temporarily<br />
reached a deal in 1992 to refer to a<br />
December 1965 border agreement<br />
for de-escalation.<br />
Another dispute point is Khafus<br />
border region. Doha and Riyadh<br />
have failed to settle the case since<br />
1965. The area is crucial for the Qataris<br />
since it links them to the UAE,<br />
their largest trade partner. Riyadh’s<br />
seizure of the area makes all of the<br />
Qatari land roads lead to the Saudi<br />
territory, which means Qatar needs<br />
to pass through Saudi lands to access<br />
the UAE.<br />
Relations with Iran<br />
Another issue standing as a polarising<br />
factor inside the body of the<br />
GCC is the failure by the member<br />
states to adopt a unanimous approach<br />
towards Iran. Saudi Arabia,<br />
spearheading a camp against growing<br />
Iranian influence in the region,<br />
seeks to sever relations between<br />
the GCC and Tehran and has recently<br />
stepped up efforts to build<br />
an anti-Iranian alliance of the Muslim<br />
countries. The recent Riyadh<br />
summit that participated by the US<br />
President Donald Trump echoed<br />
the Saudi anti-Tehran measures.<br />
But Qatar, a country that tries to<br />
adopt an independent policy expand<br />
its influence on the regional<br />
and global stage, has taken a friendly<br />
stance towards Iran.<br />
LIBYA<br />
Four Arab states – Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain<br />
and Egypt – have sent Qatar a list of 13 demands it must meet<br />
if it wants them to lift their diplomatic and economic sanctions<br />
EGYPT<br />
Gulf<br />
Co-operation<br />
Council: UAE,<br />
Bahrain, Saudi<br />
Arabia, Oman,<br />
Kuwait, Qatar<br />
Source: Associated Press<br />
The openness towards Iran aims<br />
on the one hand at serving Qatar’s<br />
political and economic interests and<br />
on the other hand at putting strains<br />
on Saudi Arabia, an archival of Tehran<br />
in the region. This comes while<br />
Riyadh focuses on prohibiting Qatar’s<br />
rise as a strong regional state<br />
politically and economically that<br />
can pose challenges to the Saudi ideal<br />
of leadership of the Muslim <strong>world</strong>.<br />
Differences over regional cases<br />
Conflicting regional policies are<br />
among the crisis-making factors in<br />
Qatar-Saudi Arabia relations. The<br />
rivalry, particularly after the 2011<br />
Arab uprisings, surged between the<br />
two sides who want to secure new<br />
areas of influence regionally. The<br />
major rivalry between the two Arab<br />
SYRIA<br />
IRAQ<br />
SAUDI<br />
ARABIA<br />
KUWAIT<br />
UAE<br />
YEMEN<br />
1 Shut down diplomatic posts in<br />
Iran, expel any members of Iran’s<br />
Revolutionary Guard and only<br />
conduct trade with Iran that<br />
complies with U.S. sanctions<br />
2 Close a Turkish military base<br />
3 Sever all ties with “terrorist<br />
organizations” including Muslim<br />
Brotherhood, Islamic State,<br />
Al Qaeda and Hezbollah<br />
IRAN<br />
4 Stop funding any extremist<br />
entities designated as terrorist<br />
groups by four countries and U.S.<br />
5 Hand over all individuals wanted<br />
by four countries for terrorism<br />
6 Shut down broadcaster<br />
Al-Jazeera and its affiliate stations<br />
7 Shut down news outlets that<br />
Qatar funds, including Arabi21<br />
and Middle East Eye<br />
OMAN<br />
states has been over hot regional<br />
cases like Yemen, Syria, Bahrain,<br />
and Egypt.<br />
When Mohamed Morsi, a political<br />
figure from the Muslim Brotherhood,<br />
was elected as the president<br />
of the post-revolution Egypt, Qatar<br />
granted Cairo $2bn in cash aid.<br />
On the opposite side, Saudi Arabia<br />
gave $11bn to the Egyptian military<br />
to remove the first democratically-elected<br />
president of Egypt. Saudi<br />
defeated Qatar in this game el-SISI<br />
ousted Morsi in 2013 after a deadly<br />
military coup.<br />
Riyadh and Qatar have been<br />
competing in Syria, too. Although<br />
the two oil-rich states mobilised<br />
their potentials to remove from<br />
power the Syrian President Basher<br />
al-Assad since 2011, they have<br />
SAUDI<br />
ARABIA<br />
30km<br />
20 miles<br />
BAHRAIN<br />
Doha<br />
QATAR<br />
8 Refuse to naturalise citizens from<br />
four countries and expel those<br />
currently on its territory<br />
9 Provide detailed information<br />
about opposition figures whom<br />
Qatar has funded in four countries<br />
<strong>10</strong> Align itself politically,<br />
economically and otherwise with<br />
Gulf Co-operation Council<br />
11 Pay unspecified sum in<br />
compensation to four nations<br />
for damage or costs incurred by<br />
Qatar’s policies in recent years<br />
12 Agree to all demands within <strong>10</strong><br />
days or they will be considered void<br />
13 Consent to be monitored for<br />
compliance with demands, with<br />
monthly reports in first year,<br />
every three months next year,<br />
then annually for <strong>10</strong> years<br />
© GRAPHIC NEWS<br />
been struggling to introduce their<br />
own allied group as the leader of<br />
the anti-Assad opposition camp.<br />
The Saudi pressures removed Moaz<br />
al-Khatib, the Qatari-backed president<br />
of the National Coalition for<br />
Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition<br />
Forces, and replaced him with<br />
Ahmad Jarba.<br />
For conclusion, it can be noted<br />
that despite all efforts to show off<br />
unity, the Arab council’s members<br />
remain divided in their bilateral<br />
and multilateral ties. The divisions<br />
sometimes even lead to efforts to<br />
destabilise the opposite side and<br />
even seek regime change. •<br />
[This is an excerpt of a Libertyfighters<br />
article, which can be found at http://bit.<br />
ly/2sRusn8]<br />
An image grab taken from a propaganda video released by Islamic State (IS) terrorists group, have shown children training for combat and performing executions<br />
Can Islamic State’s indoctrinated kids be<br />
saved from a future of violent jihad?<br />
• Tribune Desk<br />
The blue-eyed boy with the chubby<br />
cheeks still talks about the after-school<br />
movies he used to love<br />
so much. This was three years ago,<br />
when he was just 9 and living on<br />
the outskirts of Raqqa, in northern<br />
Syria. Sometimes, his father would<br />
take him and his little brother to an<br />
outdoor makeshift theatre. The films<br />
varied, but the plot was always the<br />
same: Black-clad members of the<br />
Islamic State militant group (IS) “liberated”<br />
cities from kuffar, or non-believers,<br />
chopping off their heads in<br />
bloody, righteous celebration. There<br />
was no acting involved. The films<br />
showed real events. “I thought,” the<br />
boy recalls, “it would be fun to go to<br />
jihad.” Today, the boy who asked to<br />
be identified only as Mohammed,<br />
lives with his uncle in the Turkish<br />
town of Reyhanli. When we meet on<br />
a cool evening in May in his uncle’s<br />
tidy but crowded home, I am surprised<br />
to hear that the violence in<br />
those videos never frightened him.<br />
“They are kuffar, and it is OK to kill<br />
them,” he explains. Instead, he recalls<br />
feeling “excited” as he watched<br />
the action on screen or when he<br />
spotted IS fighters patrolling the<br />
streets of Raqqa, enforcing the exacting<br />
dress codes and mosque attendance<br />
mandated by their radical<br />
interpretation of Islamic law.<br />
The drift of Mohammed and his<br />
two brothers toward IS worried his<br />
uncle, who asked to be identified<br />
only as Ra’ed, convinced the boys’<br />
father to move with his family out<br />
of Raqqa, the militant group’s main<br />
stronghold in Syria, and into Turkey.<br />
Today, Ra’ed and his own family<br />
share their home with the three<br />
boys- Mohammed, who is now 12,<br />
<strong>10</strong>-year-old Ibrahim and 16-yearold<br />
Salim and their parents. The<br />
boys are studying in a Unicef-funded<br />
school for Syrian refugees. Hoping<br />
to shift their allegiance away<br />
from violent jihad, Ra’ed bought<br />
them iPads, has them pitch in at<br />
his second-hand clothing shop and<br />
tries to gently challenge their beliefs<br />
about what it means to be a<br />
good Muslim. But even after nine<br />
months away from the jihadi group,<br />
the boys still idolize the soldiers of<br />
the self-styled caliphate. “They are<br />
always yelling at me, ‘Why did you<br />
bring us here?’” Ra’ed says. “It’s going<br />
to take time. A brain is not like a<br />
computer. Once it downloads information,<br />
it cannot easily be erased.”<br />
The propaganda<br />
IS devoted extensive resources to<br />
the indoctrination of children in its<br />
territory, which at its peak, from<br />
mid-2014 through 2015, spanned<br />
roughly a third of Syria and Iraq and<br />
was home to between 6m and 12m<br />
civilians. Swiftly and methodically,<br />
the group forced its curriculum<br />
on schools and lured children to its<br />
training camps with gifts and propaganda<br />
videos. IS also captured the<br />
children of its enemies, from Yazidis<br />
to Christians, and brainwashed<br />
many of them in training camps<br />
before sending them off to battle as<br />
soldiers or suicide bombers. Now, as<br />
US-backed forces in Syria and Iraq<br />
close in on the last IS strongholds,<br />
the <strong>world</strong> is getting an increasingly<br />
detailed look at the damage wrought<br />
on a generation of youth. The first to<br />
grapple with this damage are those<br />
on the outskirts of IS’s collapsing<br />
territory. Interviews with children<br />
now living in southern Turkey and<br />
northern Iraq who attended IS training<br />
camps and schools, as well as<br />
the therapists and security officials<br />
scrambling to assess them, open a<br />
rare window into the crisis.<br />
In addition to being far behind in<br />
their education, many of these children<br />
are suffering from trauma and<br />
other mental health issues. Some of<br />
them also alarm authorities, and,<br />
in some cases, their families, with<br />
their extremist views and violent<br />
behaviour. Liesbeth van der Heide,<br />
an expert on the rehabilitation and<br />
reintegration of terrorists at the International<br />
Centre for Counter-Terrorism<br />
in the Hague, says IS is a<br />
much graver challenge than other<br />
extremist groups that tried to radicalise<br />
communities.<br />
Slow poisoning education<br />
When IS seized control of Mosul,<br />
Iraq, and announced the establishment<br />
of its caliphate in June<br />
2014, Umar Aljbouri was working<br />
there at a government-run institute<br />
for women and children. The<br />
civil servant continued reporting<br />
to work each day as the militants<br />
asserted their control over Mosul’s<br />
nearly 2m inhabitants, one institution<br />
at a time. Eventually, they shut<br />
down his institute and instructed<br />
Aljbouri to begin reporting to a<br />
local elementary school that was<br />
short of teachers. Though Aljbouri<br />
had never taught, he was afraid to<br />
object and agreed to attend mandatory<br />
IS training courses for teachers.<br />
There, he learned that teachers<br />
and children of all ages were to be<br />
separated by gender, and they were<br />
to adhere to a strict Islamic dress<br />
code. Many subjects that had been<br />
taught, including history and literature,<br />
were scrapped; mathematics,<br />
Arabic and the study of Islam would<br />
remain, but only according to IS’s<br />
curriculum. Eventually, the group’s<br />
office of education distributed IS<br />
course materials and textbooks.<br />
“IS’s curriculum was based on<br />
extremist doctrine,” he says. “It was<br />
inviting children to hate and kill<br />
people from other religions. Even in<br />
mathematics, instead of ‘1 apple + 2<br />
apples = 3 apples,’ they would say,<br />
‘1 bullet + 2 bullets = 3 bullets.’ Parents<br />
were so worried.”The education<br />
overhaul was part of a broader<br />
indoctrination for children that IS<br />
instituted in towns and cities across<br />
its territory.<br />
Mohammed Alhamed, an activist<br />
tracking IS education in Syria,<br />
says the group used schools to ease<br />
children into the organisation. “IS<br />
doesn’t force children to join them.<br />
But they teach them their rules and<br />
everything about jihad and the Islamic<br />
State, and by the time they<br />
are older, they want to join.” While<br />
IS threatened parents who wouldn’t<br />
send their children to school with<br />
fines or lashings, it took a lighter approach<br />
with its pupils. Mohammed,<br />
the boy now in Reyhanli, attended<br />
an IS-run school for two years<br />
at a mosque in Raqqa. He says his<br />
teachers never used corporal punishment<br />
and treated students “really<br />
nice. I liked them, and I liked<br />
Islam. They said if you read the Koran,<br />
you get prizes.”<br />
Courtesy: NEWSWEEK<br />
Rehabilitation<br />
There have been small and sporadic<br />
efforts to identify the young ones in<br />
need of aid, but it is easy for parents<br />
to keep these children in the shadows.<br />
Some families who want help<br />
for their radicalised children are reluctant<br />
to seek it, fearing they will<br />
be investigated and punished by<br />
local security services. Others, like<br />
Ra’ed, think they can manage the<br />
problem on their own. The family<br />
patriarch acknowledges that there<br />
have been some missteps in his efforts<br />
to rehabilitate his nephews.<br />
Once, when Salim first arrived<br />
from Raqqa, Ra’ed brought the teen<br />
to a beach to challenge his deeply<br />
conservative views about women.<br />
Upon seeing women in bikinis, Salim<br />
fumed that he should “behead<br />
them and turn the sea red with their<br />
blood.” When Ra’ed bought Ibrahim<br />
an iPad, the boy instantly downloaded<br />
war games. But he believes he is<br />
slowly winning this war of hearts<br />
and young minds. “They are all getting<br />
better,” he insists. “It’s a different<br />
lifestyle here, and bit by bit, they<br />
are changing.” He is less optimistic,<br />
though, about the children of IS sympathisers,<br />
whom he sees from time<br />
to time around Reyhanli. One recently<br />
visited his second-hand clothing<br />
shop. The boy erupted in rage<br />
when his sister approached Ra’ed to<br />
inquire about a size. “Why are you<br />
talking to a man?” he screamed. “If<br />
you have a question, you ask me,<br />
and I ask him. I swear to God, I will<br />
go back home and have your older<br />
brother cut your head off.”As Ra’ed,<br />
recounts the story, he shakes his<br />
head. “Some of these children are<br />
growing up with jihadist ideas. And<br />
they will be a problem for the future<br />
of the whole <strong>world</strong>.” •<br />
[This is an excerpt of a Newsweek<br />
article, which can be found at http://bit.<br />
ly/2swCmhI]