JPI Spring 2018

There is a crisis of party legitimacy now present across Europe due to growing Euroskepticism
32 and concerns about immigration. Because of the tense political atmosphere, populists
have the opportunity to gain room for their platform because voters feel detached from their
traditional parties and now want someone to look up to who will defend their rights as times change.
Since many European countries were so recently under control of large dictatorships, nationalists such
as Kaczynski are uncomfortable with liberal policies because they feel out of control and out of touch
with their own state identity. However, Kaczynski and Trump’s strict control is why non-supporters
protest so severely because they feel deprived of their rights and often are. While conservatives and
nationalists work to bring the state back to their own preferred, but outdated, ideological position in
society, they feel the only way to protect their rights is to take away freedoms from others who might
otherwise infringe on the conservatives’ existence. This logic applies to both Kaczynski’s PiS and
Trump’s Republicans as both parties have a restorative intention for their countries, yet in their efforts
to protect their ideologies, they diminish minority, immigrant, and women’s rights. Further, as
populism has a contagious affect, it is worrisome that Poland is neighbors to both Germany and
previous Soviet states (such as Ukraine) who have historical ties to right-wing extremism and contain
strong populist parties with similar messages such as the Alternative for Germany (AfD) Party in
Germany who run on a hardline anti-immigration and Islamophobic policy 33 .
In all, low levels of education and lower to moderate income voters show to be successful
targets for populists. Education and income are the determinant variables for conservative candidate
support, but the driving force behind exclusionary populist success is the social divide within states
such as the North-South relationship in the United States and the East-West relationship in Poland.
Historically recent interactions with authoritarianism, racism, anti-Semitism and anti-immigration,
such as slavery and segregation in the American South and anti-Zionism in the former USSR-Polish
state push the conservative voters to follow hard-populists who they feel with get to the root of their
problems with jobs and social welfare because they claim to fight for the people and the nation, not
understanding that a nationalist, authoritative politician might have a different ideal nation in mind
than the voters.
Because of Down’s Calculus of Voting V=pB-C, if the costs outweigh the direct benefits of
the voter’s interactions with an election they are unlikely to cast a quality vote. So, combined with
education and income affecting voter’s quality of interaction at the polls, they also need a personal
attachment to the outcome. This is why populists make large campaign promises such as family
stipends or tax breaks. However, as we have seen, especially in the United States, reneged ex ante
promises creates gaps in policy resulting in inconsistent administration which often causes outbursts
from the public. This is worsened by the voter’s retrospective voting which leads to voters forgiving
many of their candidates flaws and mistakes, leading them to reflect only upon the last several months
of their candidate’s campaign, or if an incumbent running for reelection, their time in office. The
election, or reelection, of populists can then be further secured and the Down’s Calculus model turns
into V=pB-C+D with the added variable (D), in theory outweighing the costs of voting and costs of
the election outcome by providing a feeling of civic duty 34 and therefore continuing the unfortunate
success of populists despite their obvious flaws and demonstrating. Therefore, this demonstrates that
visceral motivations drive election outcomes significantly as well as rational, strategic, motivations and
rational-economic voting.
32
Albertazzi, Daniele., et. al., 2008. Print.
33
Aalberg, Toril., et. al., “Populist Political Communication in Europe”, Routledge 2017, Print., pp. 114-117.
34
Riker, William and Peter Ordeshook. 1968. “A Theory of the Calculus of Voting.” American Political Science Review 62(1): 25-42.
JPI Fall 2017, pg. 25