JPI Spring 2018

was conducive to Soviet security rather than an alliance between two Communist-led states.” 16
However, the ensuing Korean War consolidated the alliance between China and the Soviet Union.
The Korean War dragged China into a conflict in direct opposition to the United States and firmly
established China as a part of the Soviet Bloc.
Despite these issues, the Sino-U.S. rapprochement is not surprising when people recall the
history of American-Chinese friendship before 1949 and the U.S.’s frustration over the “loss” of
China. It is clear that cooperation with China to oppose the Soviet Union was not a new strategy
formed in 1972. The “loss” of China is evidence that the American opinion of China once was positive
and that this attitude shifted after 1949. With this in mind, it is misleading to conclude that Nixon’s
visit to China was startling or unprecedented. In reality, this diplomacy was consistent with the
American strategy pre-1949.
Moreover, the “loss” of China left Americans nostalgic for the former Sino-U.S. friendship
and made China an attractive candidate for rapprochement. Iriye argues that “[America and China]
had been ‘sister republics’, then wartime allies, and developed close connections through missionaries
and educators. Images produced by such experiences had not totally disappeared and could be
resurrected, made once again more authentic now that reconciliation was in effect.” 17 Indeed, the
former Sino-U.S. friendship was rediscovered in the 1970s. As more American elites noticed the
importance of China and the possibility of using China to counter the U.S.S.R., they began to support
more research on China. Media opinion also began to turn in favor of China. “American television
stations began showing films of the Asian war in which the two countries had fought together against
the Japanese enemy.” 18 Once again, American perceptions of China were shifting.
One could argue that America’s friendship extended only to the Nationalist Party and no
further. While the United States and Taiwan undoubtedly had, and continue to have, a special
relationship, this does not explain the “loss” of China because the Nationalist Republic of China in
Taiwan continued to cooperate with the U.S. after 1949. American president Eisenhower even visited
Taiwan in 1960 to show his support. While the contested definition of “China” is not the focus of this
essay, the key finding is that Nixon’s visit to China in 1972 was not the first time that America had
considered China as a partner to resist the influence of the Soviet Union. Even after the PRC assumed
power, nostalgia for the former friendship did not disappear. It served as historical background for
Sino-U.S. rapprochement over two decades later.
IDEOLOGICAL SHIFTS: FROM COMMUNIST THREAT TO THE SINO-U.S.
RAPPROCHEMENT
If the Americans only understood China as a communist enemy from 1949 to 1972, then it is
impossible to understand the American ideological shifts towards communist China. Analysis of the
American’s more nuanced perceptions of communist China during this period show us that there were
actually multiple U.S. strategies at work. For example, in the 1960s, the U.S. began to realize that China
was not a committed partner of the U.S.S.R. and, thus, began to change its attitude towards communist
China. This change provides historical context for the Sino-U.S. rapprochement.
16
Odd Westad, The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 65.
17
Akira Iriye, Across the Pacific: An Inner History of American-East Asian Relations (Chicago: Imprint Publications, 1992), 358.
18
Akira Iriye, Across the Pacific: An Inner History of American-East Asian Relations (Chicago: Imprint Publications, 1992), 358.
JPI Fall 2017, pg. 51