PROSPECT THEORY AND POLITICAL SCIENCE Jonathan Mercer

18 MERCER
use of prospect theory does not validate the theory, its influence in economics belies
the notion that it cannot handle complex environments and high stakes. Because
most political scientists rarely use psychological theories, it seems likely that the
resistance is to the discipline of psychology rather than to problems unique to
prospect theory.
Although advocates of influential ideas sometimes attribute their influence to
the quality of their ideas (Katzenstein et al. 1998), Jervis (1998) notes that an idea’s
influence is sometimes independent of its explanatory power. Such is probably the
case with prospect theory. The resistance to prospect theory in political science
mirrors what Rabin (1998) referred to as economists’ “aggressive uncuriosity” (p.
41) toward behavioral assumptions, which he correctly anticipated would fade as
economists became familiar with psychology. If behavioral economists continue
to prosper, a new generation of political economists is sure to follow. None of
this is meant to diminish the problems with extending prospect theory to explain
how political actors make decisions under risk. These problems should not be
dismissed, but neither should they be exaggerated, and always they should be
viewed in a comparative light.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
I thank Robert Jervis, Elizabeth Kier, and Rose McDermott for excellent comments
and critiques.
The Annual Review of Political Science is online at
http://polisci.annualreviews.org
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