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50 CHAPTER 1. PROGRAMS ON SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT AND TRANSBOUNDARY COOPERATION IN THE BORDER AREAS
of the Ukok Plateau, provides almost 60% of the total
Ob flow at the location where the latter is formed.
And the first step of “cooperation” for Altai will be the
construction of a gas pipeline crossing the Ukok
Plateau, which is not only an important centre of biodiversity,
but also a sacred area to the peoples living
there. A UNESCO mission, which visited the Altai
Republic specifically with regard to the proposed
pipeline construction, clearly and unambiguously
underlined the extreme fragility of alpine ecosystems
and the fact that the construction of a “transport corridor”
will inevitably result in the degradation of these
ecosystems and the subsequent loss of numerous sacred
sites and monuments of ancient history and culture of
the region (see Annexes, map “Alternative route of the
‘Altai’ pipeline system proposed by NGOs”).
The official propaganda insists that this integration scenario
“has no alternatives”. At the same time, the ongoing
breakthrough in gas and oil production technologies
and the rapid growth of energy efficiency
makes the construction of large-scale international gas
pipelines an extremely risky enterprise potentially leading
to enormous debts. Nowadays, an alpine gas pipeline
would definitely be beneficial only to those who are
going to make a profit on its construction. Taking a
broader look at the cooperation in the Altai region, one
should note that there already exist two transport corridors
in the centre of Asia — through Mongolia and
Kazakhstan. The reliance on these existing corridors
may lead to more balanced integration in the larger
region. China realises this and de facto recognises possible
alternatives. In particular, in February 2010 an
announcement was made of the expansion of the
Taikeshken checkpoint on the China — Mongolia border
and the certification of the checkpoint as an international
one.
A brief conclusion
The 2018 Cooperation Programme is a sign of a failure
to achieve the harmonisation of development plans of
Russia’s and China’s border regions. To Russia, this
means a total collapse of sound development strategies,
which ultimately leads to serious economic, political,
social, and environmental risks. To China, the
Programme is generally aligned with the objectives of
comprehensive socio-economic development, but fails
to adequately take into account the potential for transboundary
social and political tensions and transboundary
aspects of environmental safety.
The “resource model” of integration as a foundation for
transboundary cooperation encourages both countries
to loosen their environmental and social standards,
avoiding investments in innovations and diversification
of the economies. In the short-term and medium-term
perspective, this reduces the competitiveness and investment
attractiveness of the region. This is much more relevant
to East Russia than to the border provinces of
China, since significant segments of the Northeast
China’s economy undergo the processes of active diversification
and development in cooperation with South
China, Taiwan, Japan, Korea, the USA, and the European
Russia. In this context, the fact that Russia in fact
subsidises the economy of Northeast China by supporting
the 2018 Cooperation Programme is probably
not that critical to the development of the Northeast
China’s economy but definitely contributes to this
development.
The political decisions made in Russia and China lead
to a deliberate narrowing of the range of development
options for the Russian Far East and Baikal Region
and, ultimately, to the “colonial exploitation” model of
development. There are indications that the region is
already becoming less attractive to domestic and foreign
investors with a different perspective on economic diversification
and innovations. The existing development
model, when projected into the future, leaves no hope
for self-realisation and decent living conditions and the
region becomes increasingly less attractive, particularly
for energetic and proactive people. The population of
the border regions has already decreased by 7—20%
and the approved development policies will only lead to
a further decrease.
The main global risk associated with the existing model
of Russia — China cooperation is the accelerating
degradation of natural ecosystems and the living environment
in the border areas. The north of China is an
area of environmental disaster, and enormous funds are
spent on attempts to reverse adverse trends.
Until recently, Russia was separated from these
degraded areas by a belt of relatively undisturbed forests
and steppes, and by the Amur Basin ecosystem capable
of self-purification. The “infrastructure and resource
extraction” model of cooperation, not supported by
adequate environmental oversight and rehabilitation
measures, leads to a rapid destruction of this protective
buffer and subsequently to a dramatic degradation of
already difficult living conditions in the border regions
of the Russian Far East. Unfortunately, both the 2018
Cooperation Programme and internal development
strategies for the Russian Far East, Transbaikal, and
Siberia, uncoordinated with the former, lead to aggravation
of these problems rather than to their mitigation,
and are unable to offer sound approaches to tackling
them.