January-February - Air Defense Artillery

46 THE COAST ARTILLERY JOURNAL January-February
North Africa, on the East Front behind each group of
armies and in Germany proper. These air Beets are administrative
and tactical organizations. In each air
Beet area, there are ground crews and facilities for handling
a large number of combat aircraft. Germany's
air power is shuttled around these air fleets according to
the situation. If a serious air threat loomed in the west,
combat aviation could be transferred from the other
air Beets to the west on short notice. Antiaircraft organization
and employment is identical in principle.
There is usually an antiaircraft corps in each air fleet.
A German principle of command is enunciated as
follows:
"Select the commander, assign him to the mission,
give him the means, and permit him to accomplish the
task unhampered."
This is merely another way of phrasing the unity of
command and responsibility and the task-force principles.
After a commander has been assigned a mission, he
selects his staff (which may include members of the
Army, Navy, and Air Force General Staffs), adopts a
general plan and from it, prepares a list of means with
which to accomplish his task. The main considerations
in the preparation of the list of means are:
1. The Mission (Offensive or defensive.)
2. The Enemy Organization (analysis for
weakness).
Strength (Particularly in
various arms).
Composition (Air Power
and Tanks).
Morale (Can propaganda
be used?).
Leadership (Higher, Field,
and Company grades).
Dispositions (Where can
traps be formed and en-
3. The Terrain
4. The Climate, Season,
and \i\Teather
5. The Time Element
emy destroyed?).
(Desert, Swampy, Normal,
or Mountainous.)
(Russia in winter or North
Africa in summer.)
(When must the task be
accomplished so it may
be timed \vith other operations?)
6. The Theater of \iVar (Long Lines of Communications.
Supply and
Evacuation Problems.
Transportation. )
7. The Means Available (There is never enough air
power.)
8. The General Plan
9. The Judgment of the Commander and his Staff.
The German High Command allots the means to the
task force commander after a similar consideration of
the foregoing factors.
\\Then the means are made available, thev resemble
a college football squad which reports to th~ coach in
the first week of September. They are a squad but not
a team.
A German task force prepared for combat is like an
Army football team prepared for the Navy game. It is
organized, drilled, and trained for the task at hand-to
defeat a particular opponent. As a matter of fact, the
same considerations outlined earlier for the composition
of a German task force may apply equally well for the
football team.
When the means are allotted to a task-force commander,
all or part of them are reallotted to subordinate
echelons in accordance with their estimated needs.
Thus any standard German unit in combat will normally
be reinforced. Intelligence officers can readily
understand why the composition of practically every
German unit with which they come in contact will be
different. The problem then is to probe by aggressive
reconnaissance methods to determine what units are
opposite, how they are organized, and of what they are
composed.
The following diagram illustrates the method by
which large German task forces are formed.
Just a word about the designation of units. The
method of allotting numerical designations is without
pattern. It is different in almost every case encountered.
No deduction based on numerical designations is justified
without other supporting evidence.
When a standard organization such as a regiment,
division, or a corps is not used as the nucleus of a task
force, the cluster of units is often called a "Gruppe"
(Group [of units]). Often the name of the commander
is attached to identify it.
German strategical and tactical principles are similar.
They are based on the principle of annihilation as
evolved by von Clausewitz, and as carried into execution
by Graf von Schlieffen in his military textbook
Cannae.
The principles of war, according to the German conception,
are unchanged; the methods whereby they are
realized are different.
During World War I, the Germans used the supporting
arms to advance the infantry to where it could
corne to grips with the enemy infantry, and destroy it or
drive it from the field. In this war, the German supporting
arms are used to destroy the enemy without forcing
the infantry to engage in combat. The break-throughs
are made by special assault troops (usually pioneers);
air-panzer-motorized infantry teams, powerfully supported
by artillery, blast their way through to make the
encirclements, and the annihilations in the traps are
accomplished largely by the fire power of the supporting
arms. The infantry follows up, holds the ground,
and takes charge of the prisoners. Large masses of infantrv
do not corne in contact with each other with the
resulting mass slaughter reminiscent of Verdun in the
first vVorld War.