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Brown Undergraduate Law Review -- Vol. 2, No. 1 (Fall 2020)

We are proud to present the Brown Undergraduate Law Review's Fall 2020 issue. We hope you will all find our authors' works fascinating and thought-provoking.

We are proud to present the Brown Undergraduate Law Review's Fall 2020 issue. We hope you will all find our authors' works fascinating and thought-provoking.

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illegitimate origins of the constitution as the premise for its

replacement.

Chilean critiques of the constitution go deeper than its

symbolic baggage and moral illegitimacy, and include

more substantive reasons for needing a new constitution.

One such critique is that the 1980 constitutional text limits

the government?s ability to increase spending on welfare

and social programs. 26 Pinochet?s regime did not only

implement neoliberal economic policies during its time in

power, but also wrote into the constitution an emphasis on

property rights and constraints on state interference.

Article 19, for example, guarantees private property rights

and incorporates measures that deny the state?s ability to

infringe on those rights. 27 Article 67 requires Congress to

indicate the allocation and amount of a new expenditure,

and any expenditures that exceed projections require that

Congress ?proportionately reduce all expenditures,

regardless of their nature.? 28 This limits the ability of the

Chilean government to enact the kinds of social policies

sought by the many Chileans who are adversely affected

by an inequitable distribution of wealth and power. 29 This

is one way in which the 1980 constitution hinders the

Chilean government from meeting the demands of the

Chilean people and truly representing the kinds of policies

they seek.

A related problem is that the rules set out for a

constitutional amendment require very high quorums

within Congress to approve constitutional reforms, making

it difficult to achieve changes to the existing document.

Chile?s Constitutional Renewal: A Lesson to be Learned?

The force of the military dictatorship facilitated the

implementation of a status quo that could never have

otherwise been achieved, allowing for a ?polarizing

right-wing veto against democratic decision making? to

control the political system. 30 Owing to its permanent high

quorum provisions and supra-majoritarian mechanisms

ensuring the supremacy of the Chilean right wing, the

constitution denies ?the democratic process by which the

will of the people translates into law and public policy, the

basic feature of democracy.? 31

This puts the constitution at the root of many Chileans?

persisting dissatisfaction with institutions, politics, and

representatives. 32 Chile?s current crisis of representation

and the related public discontent with

difficult-to-dismantle neoliberal conventions are thus

closely linked to the constitution. While laws have

gradually progressed to reconcile social views and

legislation with regard to issues of social, ethnic, and

human rights, the 1980 constitution will perpetually deny

key components of a proper democratic process. 33

The Challenges of Constitutional Renewal

Constitutional replacement will not necessarily resolve the

legitimacy problem of the current document. New

constitutions lack the power of procedural precedent and

institutional norms, rendering younger constitutions

inherently less legitimate than older ones. 34 This creates

the paradoxical possibility that in replacing the 1980

constitution to address its problem of illegitimacy, a new

such problem is created. Venezuela, where 26

26. Bellolio, "Will the People.?

27. Andrew Berryhill, "Constitutional Restraints and Economic Stability: Explaining Chile's Economic Development since 1990," Collegiate

Scholars Program Thesis (CSP 401-402), 2019, 19.

28. Ibid., 13.

29. Bellolio, "Will the People.?

30. Heiss, 475.

31. Ibid., 471.

32. Ibid., 470.

33. Ibid., 471.

34. Ibid., 24.

Brown Undergraduate Law Review

32

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