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Brown Undergraduate Law Review -- Vol. 2, No. 1 (Fall 2020)

We are proud to present the Brown Undergraduate Law Review's Fall 2020 issue. We hope you will all find our authors' works fascinating and thought-provoking.

We are proud to present the Brown Undergraduate Law Review's Fall 2020 issue. We hope you will all find our authors' works fascinating and thought-provoking.

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Was Privacy a Mistake? An Examination of Privacy, Liberty, and Equality in Reproductive Freedom

female reproductive rights. As Ely argues, liberty can only liberty on the practice of equality, but also fully embracing

be pursued when all citizens in a democracy are considered and legalizing this connection? something Justice

on an equal basis. Ginsburg applies this argument to

reproductive rights as she suggests that women can only

exist as equal citizens when they live in a world where

restrictions are not placed on their ability to receive an

abortion. While Ginsburg ultimately uses notions of

privacy previously established in Roe and Casey as the

Ginsburg could? and arguably should? have advocated

for in her dissent in Carhart. Here, the Court?s ruling

serves as a model that Ely and Ginsburg have strived to

implement: utilizing an equal protection framework to

ensure basic human rights.

Privacy: A Mistake

basis of her argument against the Court?s ruling, it is clear

from her previous work on Struck and in the language of

her dissent that her ultimate belief is that women cannot

achieve true constitutional liberty unless they have

complete equality under the law, which requires the

recognition and granting of reproductive rights under an

equal protection framework. 23

Thus, the utilization of the right to privacy as a vehicle

through which abortion rights are granted is a mistake. It is

a mistake because this process does not acknowledge

reproductive freedom as what it should be: a conversation

surrounding gender inequality and equal protection.

Privacy does not protect or reinforce the equal status of

women; it does not recognize the innate burden women

While not related to women?s reproductive rights, the

constitutional duality between liberty and equality was

affirmed as a vehicle that granted marriage rights under an

equal protection framework in Obergefell v. Hodges

(2015). In this case, the Court held that the Due Process

Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not only

guarantee the right to marry as a protected liberty but also

that the Equal Protection Clause mandates that the

preceding analysis be applied to same-sex couples in the

same manner as it does to opposite-sex couples. 24 In the

bear because of their reproductive capabilities, and because

of the institutionalized structure of society that already

places a significant portion of child rearing on mothers.

Privacy instead provides a false notion of liberty, leaving

room for states to infringe upon the freedom of women to

make decisions for themselves. If the right to privacy in

cases of abortion is derived from liberty emphasized in

Roe and Casey, and liberty is intertwined with equal

protection, privacy is a false derivation of liberty if it is

unable to grant equality.

court?s opinion, Justice Anthony Kennedy writes,

In her essay ?On The Distinction Between Sex and

The right of same-sex couples to marry that is part of

the liberty promised by the Fourteenth Amendment is

derived, too, from the Amendment?s guarantee of the

equal protection laws. The Due Process Clause and the

Equal Protection Clause are connected in a profound

way, though they set forth independent principles. 25

This case serves as an example of the Court not only

Gender,? Susan Okin illustrates the limitations of privacy

in establishing equality; she writes of ?false gender

neutrality,? the concept that simply an acknowledgement

of women by shifting language from ?he? to ?he or she,?

or ?persons,? in political theories does not sufficiently

recognize their strife, but instead leads to a notion of false

inclusion. She writes,

acknowledging the reliance between the achievement of

23. Brettschneider. Decisions and Dissents, xxx.

24. Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644 (2017).

25. Ibid., 576 U.S. 663.

Brown Undergraduate Law Review

48

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