The 1451 Review (Volume 1) 2021

giving a renewed importance to its neighbouring countries, particularly Ukraine. This
led to a more assertive foreign policy and created conditions for the annexation.
A Constructivist Argument: Russian Civilisationism and the Near Abroad
The Rose and Orange revolutions in Georgia and Ukraine in the mid-2000s made
Russia aware of the West’s soft power in its neighbouring states (Feklyunina, 2016:
781). This combined with a refusal of the western powers to acknowledge Russia’s
interests increased the importance of the ‘near abroad’ in Russian foreign policy (Hopf,
2016: 244). This manifested itself in Russia attempting to use its own soft power by
promoting a Russian identity abroad. Russia began to emphasise its cultural
distinctness from the West, portraying itself as a regional leader of Slavic people. This
identity discourse focused on ‘traditional’ values, orthodox Christianity, a glorified
view of Soviet military history as well as the promotion of the Russian language abroad.
Tsygankov and Tsygankov (2010: 3) label this discourse based on cultural
distinctiveness as ‘civilizationism’.
Contrary to what some critics believe, this turn to civilisationism and the
eventual annexation of Crimea was not driven by imperialistic motives. Instead, Putin
wished to present a superior civilisation to the West that Russia was the leader of
(Tsygangov, 2015: 297). This was done in a variety of ways. In 2007, Putin launched
the Russkiy Mir (Russian World) foundation, aiming to promote Russian language and
literature abroad (Russkiymir.ru). Elites incorporated the notion of a distinct Russian
world into foreign policy, and other discourses were weakened (Feklyunina, 2016:
783). Russia also began to use the term ‘compatriots’ in its foreign policy concepts. The
definition of Russian ‘compatriots’ was kept purposefully vague, including
descendants of the Soviet Union, Russian speakers as well as anyone with cultural ties
to Russia (Feklyunina, 2016: 782). Finally, Russia began to emphasise the ‘shared
history’ it had with its post-soviet neighbours. Ukraine had an important role to play
in this foreign policy. As a neighbouring country with close cultural ties to Russia, a
shared history as well as a high population of Russian speakers, it was a key area in
which Russia could exert its soft power.
Civilisationism, Crimea and the West
The ideas that encompass Russia’s soft power ⸻ the Russian language, the
‘compatriots’ issue and Soviet military history ⸻ were all used as justifications for
Crimea. Putin argued that the Ukraine proposal to reduce Russian from a national to
a regional language was discriminatory against Russian speakers (Rotaru and
Troncotă, 2017: 33). As Russia had positioned itself as a defender of Russian
‘compatriots’, he said the annexation was protecting the Russian minority in Crimea.
The reliance on a ‘shared history’ is particularly important to Russia’s foreign policy,
Putin often relies on politicised selection of past events (Rotaru and Troncotǎ, 2017:
337). The Crimea incident offers a case in point: Putin accused Kyiv of siding with
fascists who had fought against the Soviet Union in World War Two (Tsygankov, 2015:
293). Furthermore, he called Crimea a ‘city of Russia’s military glory’, using historical
patriotism to lay claim to the peninsula (Kremlin.ru: 2014). Pearce and Yuchshenko
(2018: 91) argue that the reliance on the Soviet past blurs territorial integrity and is
then used to breach sovereignty. Putin has been utilising a Russian civilistionist
identity to exert soft power abroad since 2007. This discourse culminated in Crimea,
where Putin gave himself plausible deniability under the guise of ‘protecting’ Russians.
This was indicated in his Crimea acceptance speech: ‘Standards were imposed on these
nations that did not in any way correspond to their way of life, traditions, or these
peoples’ cultures’ (Kremlin.ru: 2014).
By emphasising the cultural differences between the West and Russia’s ‘near
abroad’, Putin lays claim to the post–soviet countries. This allows him to discount
western involvement, saying that they do not understand the distinct culture and
history of the East in the same way Russia does.
Western institutions played an important role in the annexation, too, as their
expansion cultivated Putin’s civilisationist discourse. Identity formation helps a state
define its threats. Hopf (2016: 228) argues that western policies have played a
significant role in ‘reconstituting Russian identities’. This is particularly true regarding
Russia’s portrayal of western institutions. Since the colour revolutions, Russia has
attempted to depict the EU and NATO as imposing their ‘western’ values onto Russia
and the near abroad. Williams and Neumann (2000: 361) argue that there were only
two stances Russia could take regarding NATO expansion after the end of the Cold
War. It could either be an ‘apprentice’ seeking to join NATO, or a ‘countercivilisational
force’ that was opposed to enlargement. By 2007, Russia had decided on
the latter. This was shown during Putin’s speech at the 2007 Munich conference, in
which he stated that NATO was ‘trying to impose new dividing lines and walls on us
[Russia and the post-soviet space]’ (Kremlin.ru: 2007). The US dominated institution
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