Rambouillet Peace Conference - Hawaii Pacific University

Boshkovich 66
of border patrols) from the area in which terrorists/rebellions are targeting members of
other ethnic groups? Is it possible that negotiators did not want to offer to the Serbs some
kind of deal that would say for example that Serbian armed forces could stay in all those
areas where Serbs are the majority (northern Kosovo and few enclaves in the south,
including several monasteries)? Obviously there was no true desire to find a political
solution and avoid war.
Nevertheless, the most unacceptable parts of this Chapter and Agreement overall
was the section in which was stated that NATO troops would be allowed to use the entire
territory of FR (Federal Republic) Yugoslavia, to include air space and territorial waters,
without any restrictions. 160 Besides that, those NATO troops would be immune from any
laws of Yugoslavia, and they would be protected from any kind of investigations or
arrests. This meant that Yugoslavia would not loose sovereignty just in Kosovo but on
the entire territory. Why did not negotiators offer something more acceptable to the
Serbs? It is not a rocket science to understand that the Serbs would be more willing to
sign the treaty if it said that UN troops will be deployed instead of NATO, and not in the
entire territory of Yugoslavia, but just in the parts of Kosovo where the Albanians are
majority, to make sure that two sides are divided by a buffer zone, just like the case of
Cyprus where UN troops are doing a good job since 1974.
In addition to this, at the end of this Chapter was stated that three years after the
implementation of this agreement the people of Kosovo would have a chance to reach a
final solution for Kosovo based on their will. This was the first time that the Albanian
160 Tim Judah, Kosovo: War and Revenge (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000), 210.