Rambouillet Peace Conference - Hawaii Pacific University
Rambouillet Peace Conference - Hawaii Pacific University
Rambouillet Peace Conference - Hawaii Pacific University
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Boshkovich 67<br />
side had some major complaints. 161 They requested that ―will of people‖ was changed to<br />
―referendum‖. That is the moment when Madeleine Albright jumped in to make sure that<br />
the Albanians would accept the Agreement. She added her interpretation (on 22 nd<br />
February) to this chapter summarizing that this meant that people of Kosovo would be<br />
able to hold referendum regarding the future of Kosovo in three years. 162 Marc Weller<br />
talked about this as well. He said that the Albanian delegation confirmed that after three<br />
years of the interim period ―…the people of Kosovo will exercise their will through a<br />
referendum, conducted freely and fairly‖. 163 How could anyone expect that the Serbs<br />
would accept this document? That way Serbia would agree to the secession of Kosovo in<br />
2002, which is still worse than a unilateral declaration of independence. Interestingly,<br />
even if the US said that this proposal would be available only if the Albanians sign by the<br />
deadline it did not happen. 164 However, this did not have any negative effects on the<br />
Albanian position, and they did finally agree to sign this after Jim O‘Brien (the State<br />
Department lawyer) told Jamie Rubin to distract Thaci (the strongest opponent of<br />
acceptance of the proposal) while the Albanian delegation is accepting the proposal. 165<br />
Of course, this was just another aspect of the Agreement that was obviously<br />
unacceptable for Serbs (since everybody knows what would be the outcome of that<br />
referendum). Ministries of the Contact Group added that the entire conference (which<br />
was prolonged for a week) should be finished by 1500 on February 23 rd of 1999. The<br />
Serbian delegation sent a couple of letters that day to all three co-presides of the<br />
<strong>Conference</strong> where they urged for a continuation of negotiations, but it was ineffective and<br />
161 Ibid, 211.<br />
162 Ibid, 215.<br />
163 Marc Weller, ―The <strong>Rambouillet</strong> <strong>Conference</strong> on Kosovo,‖ International Affairs 75, no.2 (1999): 235.<br />
164 Tim Judah, Kosovo: War and Revenge (New Haven: Yale <strong>University</strong> Press, 2000), 215.<br />
165 Madeleine Albright, Madam Secretary: A Memoir (New York: Easton Press, 2003), 404.