Rambouillet Peace Conference - Hawaii Pacific University

Boshkovich 78
solution, as well as Serbian willingness to discuss about the character of international
presence in Kosovo. 192 But, it seems that the international community was not willing to
give peace a chance because they made deadline for acceptance of the agreement, even if
―…a significant number of substantive issues had not been negotiated‖. 193 Not to mention
that the most important annexes of the agreement were presented day before the deadline.
Yet there was some chance for avoidance of the war because both sides agreed to attend
new conference in Paris on 15 th March, but it ended just with Albanian acceptance to sign
the document and Serbian decision to present their version of the Agreement. 194 The
author of this paper thinks that there was a hidden agenda by the international community
not to achieve a peace solution because it does not make sense that negotiators did not
want to give more time to the time.
Besides Mr. Milutinovic, exactly one month later (23 rd March 1999) the President
of Yugoslavia Mr. Milosevic also made an official statement regarding the conference,
which was written just one day after Mr. Holbrooke‘s last trip to Belgrade where he said
that the bombing is imminent if Yugoslavia does not accept the Rambouillet accords. 195
Milosevic‘s statement was sent in form of the letter to Ministers of Foreign Affairs
Hubert Vedrine (France) and Robin Cook (UK), the official co-chairmen of the
conference. Unfortunately, this letter was not published, but is a part of the most knowing
collection of documents regarding Kosovo and Metohija published in Cambridge. These
are some of the most significant points of that letter.
192
Marc Weller, ―The Rambouillet Conference on Kosovo,‖ International Affairs 75, no.2 (1999): 233.
193
Ibid, 231.
194
Ibid, 234.
195
Tim Judah, Kosovo: War and Revenge (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000), 227.